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PREFACE 
first exposure to Vietnam was through two, one-year assignments 
(1966-67 and 1968-69) in that country as a member of the United States 
Amjy, Meeting the people of Vietnam a startling experience. Here 
was a nation at war. Yet, the people did not seem to care—they appeared 
fatalistic, indifferent, and uninvolved—hardly the response one expects 
from paopi© whose state is engrossed in warfare 1 Was this impression of 
the Vietnamese accurate or was there more to the story? 
Later, as a graduate student, I wanted to purstia this qrxtistion and 
gain a saore comprehensive understanding of Vietnam. After sc.na initial 
research work on the subject, I became fascinated with the apparent 
emergence of Vietnamese nationalism. Its germination and intensification 
had been stimulated and perpetuated by the impact of French coloniasition. 
By the end of World War II, this phenomenon had becostis a prsdossiiiatc 
force in Vietnam. Although my first intention was to follow the evolu­
tion of Vietnamese nationalism to the present time, it soon became 
obvious that such a scope Mjuld be too massive for a masters thesis. 
Therefore, I limited the study to the end of the French-Indochina Vfer, 
ii 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Vietnam •was one of many underdeveloped countries to feel the 
effects and suffer the consequences of nineteenth century Vfestem 
imperialism. Conquered by the French in approximately 1885» it took the 
Vietnamese seventy years to force the French to retreat from this land. 
The impetus for this victory came largely from the forces generated by 
Vietnamese nationalism. Howaver, to appraise Vietnamese nationalism, it 
is first necessary to establish the basic constructs of nationalism. 
What is Nationalism? 
Although the noted historian, Hans Kohn, traces the roots of 
nationalism to ancient Judea and Hellas, it emerged as a force in 
seventeenth century England, manifested itself in Fx-ance during the 
French Revolution, and then spread throughout the, European continent in 
the nineteenth century.^ According to Barbara Vfeird, nationalism is a 
force which has dominated the recent history of mankind, " , . . , v® 
are perfectly justified in saying that nationalism is by far the 
2 
strongest political force with 'iriiich w© have to reckon," Nationalism 
generates trewendoua power because usnder its banner it can employ the 
^Hans Kchn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York: The MacmiUan 
Company, 19^)» P» 2?. 
2 
Barbara Wfeird^ Five Ideas that Chanpie the Vforld (New York: W, W. 
Norton and Company, Inc., 1959)» P* 28. 
1 
2 
resources of its state and gain the emotional support of its people to 
accomplish national goals. However, nationalism defies a precise 
definition. 
Professor Boyd C. Shafer states, "Nationalism ... is not a neat, 
3 
fixed concept but a varying combination of beliefs and conditions." 
Consequently, to grasp the meaning of nationalism these conditions and 
beliefs must be studied. H. A. L. Fisher believes the key to under­
standing nationalism is the word, "common"t "What is essential to the 
growth of the national spirit is a common history—.common sufferings, 
common triumphs, common achievements, common memories, and, it isay be 
added, common aspirations."^ Shafer, substantiating Fisher's theory5 
sees the only reasonable way to get at the nature of nationalism is to 
determine >diat beliefs and what conditions are most commonly present, 
and lists ten: 
1. A certain defined (often vaguely) unit of territory 
(whether possessed or coveted), 
2. Some common cultural characteristics such as language (or 
widely understood languages), customs, manners, and litera­
ture (folk tales and lore are a beginning). If an individual 
believes he shares these, and wishes to continue sharing 
them, he is usually said to be a member of the nationality. 
3. Some common dominant social (as christian) and economic (as 
capitalistic or recently comm'unistic) institutions, 
4. A common independent or sovereign government (type does not 
m a t t e r )  o r  t h e  d e s i r e  f o r  o n e  . . . .  
5» A belief in a common history ... and in a common origin 
• • • • 
^Boyd C. Shafer, Nationalism; tfyth and Reality (New Yorks 
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1955)» P* 7. 
A. L. RLsher, "The Common Weal, 1924," in The Dynamics of 
Nationalism^ ed, Louis L, Snyder (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van 
Nostrand Company, Inc., 1964), p, 26, 
3 
6. A love or esteem for fellow nationals (not necessarily as 
individxxals). 
7. A devotion to the entity called the nation, i^ich embodies 
the common territory, cultxire, social and economic 
institutions, government, and the fellow nationals, and 
which is at the same time more than their sura. 
8. A common pride in the achievements (often the military more 
than the cultural) of this nation and a common sorrow in its 
tragedies (particularly its defeats). 
9. A disregard for or hostility to other (not necessarily all) 
like groups, especially if these prevent or seem to threaten 
the separate national existence, 
10, A hope that the nation will have a great and glorious future 
• • • 
In his book, Shafer extensively explores each of the above points. 
He concedes that his list is certainly not infallible and that exceptions 
to each point can be found. In fact, exceptions, according to Louis 
Slider, are a common feature of nationalism. "Natiorialism may mean-
whatever a given people, on the basis of their own historical experience, 
decide it to mean."^ 
While Hans Kohn would agree to the "common" concept approaek to 
nationalism, he puts more emphasis on a national vdll: 
Nationalism is first and foremost a state of mind, an act 
of consciousness, which since the French Revolution has become 
more and more common to mankind. The mental life of man is 
much dominated by an ego-consciousness as it is by a group-
consciousness. Both are complex states of mind at iprfiich we 
arrive through experiences of differentiation and opposition, 
of the ego and the surrotinding world, of the we-group and those 
outside the group.? 
•^Shafer, Nationalism: Hvth and Reality, pp. 7-8. 
Mollis L. Snyder, The Meaning of Nationalism (New Yorki Greenwood 
Press, 1968), p, 11, 
"^Hans Kohn, "Nationalism as Group Consciousness, 19^," in The 
dynamics of Nationalism, ed, by Louis L. Snyder (Princeton, New Jersey: 
D. Van Kostrand Company, Inc,, 196^), p. 18. 
4 
More succinctly, Carlton J, H. Hayes sxans up nationalism by 
stating* 
Nationalism is a modem emotional fusion and exaggeration 
of two very old phenomena—nationality and patriotism. There 
always have been, so far as historians and anthropologists 
know, human entities that can properly be called nationalities. 
There has been from ancient times the love of country or native 
land, >Mch is patriotism.® 
Conditions Vihich Stimulate Nationalism 
As Karl W. Deutsch writes, nationalism is, "Qualitative rather 
9 
than quantitative, unsuited thus far for measurement . . . ." There­
fore, to appraise this phenomenon, it is necessaiy to observe the 
relationship and interaction of the different parts« or coMacn conditions 
and beliefs as outlined above, of nationalism. Kohn assarts that most of 
the common conditions have always existed and that they, in themselves, 
do not form nationalismj 
They are the national elements out of which nationalism is 
formed; but nationalism is not a national phenorseaonj net a 
product of "eternal" or "natural" laws; it is a product ot 
the growth of social and intellectual factors at a certain 
stage of history.^® 
Nationalism in Vfestem Europe 
In Vfestem Europe, nationalism did not develop earlier because 
feudal, agricultural Ehirope did not need nor did it stimtilate national­
ism. The middle and working classes were not strong enough to demand or 
8 
Carlton J. H. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism (New York} The 
Macmillan Company, 1926), p. 6, 
9 
Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Commxmication (New Yorkj 
John VfLley & Sons, Inc., 1953)» P* 
^^Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, p. 6. 
5 
to form national institutions. The local nature and low level of 
industiy, the trickle of trade, and the bad roads certainly did not 
demand such institutions. And, the slow communication of ideas and the 
illiteracy of the bulk of the people prevented the rise of that national 
consciousness essential to the rise and growth of national institutions.^^ 
However, industrialization, modernization, and the need for national 
secvirity changed this sitmtion: 
The very magnitude of the problems faced hy eighteenth-
century societies compelled national solutions. Fewer and 
fewer political, economic, and social problems cotild be solved 
by individual or local group effort. Popxalations increased 
and men were brought closer together the slowly but con­
stantly improving means of communications. Trade flos^ beyond 
the provinces, ideas circulated beyond the courts andf«apit^is 
.... Each individual life depended increasingly liptm a 
growing nvaaber of others. The nation-state became the* institu­
tional will of the group and the idea of nation the symbol of 
their unity. 
Shafer also explains that once the concept of nationalisia is 
13 
firmly implanted, it becomes self-perpetuating. A national spirit 
becomes the group norm for the populace upon •lAiich national institutions 
are founded. These institutions, in turn, control the people. Then, 
succeeding generations are forced to conform to the nationalistic 
system. 
Nationalism in Vietnam 
The emergence of national institutions and a nationalistic spirit 
in Vietnam during the latter part of the nineteenth and early part of 
^^Shafer, Nationalism} >tyth and Reality, p. 10. 
^^Ibid., p. 116. ^^Ibid., pp. 100-101. 
6 
the twentieth century was not a phenomenon limited to Vietnam. National­
ism in the East was a product of cultural contact with the West, This 
contact was manifested primarily thro-ugh Iffestem impeidalism—a system 
which exploited and threatened the existence of the people of the East. 
Reacting to imperialism, the different colonial states tried to free 
themselves from Vfestem domination. However, it soon became obvious to 
the indigenous people that the foreign influence would have to be 
expelled by force. 
The alien rulers* main motive was the accumulation of wealth. 
They did not perceive the social, economic, and political raforras the 
people sought as beneficial to their purpose. Instead of change, this»: 
colonists wanted to maintain the status quo and therefore attempted to 
svippress the reform aspirations of the people. But suppression only 
intensified the desires of the people for independence. The 
of interaction between the people increased as they ladtsd ai?,d mobilii.sd 
in a common causes "Such a struggle, with a common origin, a common aim 
and likewise a common adversary, vinites the peoples of Asia , , . in the 
fellowship of a common destiny," 
Prior to being colonized, Vietnam possessed numerous common 
attributes. In fact, her society was more homogeneous than were most 
Vfestem states. Yet, nationalism was not a force in pre-colonial 
Vietnam because she had not reached that social, economic, and political 
^^Hans Kohn, A History of Nationalism in the East (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1929)> p. 1. 
7 
developmental stage in her history, explained above by Hans Kohn, vdiich 
precipitates nationalism. 
One of her main social institutions was the autonomous village 
system. The masses, or the peasants vrtio resided in the villages, were 
governed by an elite class called the mandarinate. The behavior of all 
the people was largely determined ty the static nature of Confucian 
principles and ancient customs. Since interaction between members of 
the different villages was minimal and not influential, the peasants* 
sphere of interest and concern, generally, did not exceed the boimdaries 
of their village. Even though the people were patriotic, this fsjs^^g ms 
confined to their ow-n respective village. Therefore, th® " 
village system and social mores subdivided the populace into jfiumerous 
small groups and isolated each one from the others. 
Thus, in Vietnam a condition existed as alreacfy axplainsd 
Carlton J. H. Hayes. The people were ethnically homogeneous and ̂ tri-
otic in their own way, but they were not nationalistic since interaction 
between the people was restricted to village level. 
French conquest significantly altered this situation. The 
foreigners, taking over the political power of the elite, instituted new 
economic policies based on Western technology and managerial methods. 
These policies undercut Vietnamese traditions and shattered the village 
system. The colonial administration was designed to make the colonists 
rich and did not provide for the essential economical or political rights 
of the people. As the living conditions of the Vietnamese became intol­
erable, a succession of influential Vietnamese leaders continued to lead 
the fight for the independence of Vietnam. 
8 
In the protracted struggle iMch ensued against the French, 
Vietnamese nationalism emerged through an evolutionary process* Ini-
tially, the Vietnamese who led the opposition movements merely wanted to 
defeat the foreigners and to reestablish their traditional institutions. 
However, as the conflict progressed, the Vietnamese leaders became aware 
of the profound effect Vfestem imperialism was having, not only in their 
own coTintry, but throughout Asia. It became apparent to them that their 
static, Confucian-type society could not compete with the dynamics of the . 
technologically oriented Western states and that a thoz>ough change in 
the existing conditions was necessazy. 
This evolutionaiy process transversed five discernible stagers 
1. The Con Vuong (loyalty to the king) raovemeiiit was the 
Vietnamese initial response to French conquest. It was led by the man­
darin elite and was not nationalistic in natvire, but rather xenophobic 
and regional. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Ffendi, had 
thoroTighly cmished the outward manifestations of this movement. 
2. Although the Middle Class Movement dominated the first quarter 
of the twentieth century, it reached its apex of power just prior to 
World \fer I. This movement was led by Phan Boi Chau and Phan Chau Trinh 
who agreed on ends, independence for Vietnam, but disagreed on the means, 
Chau was an elitist whose plan of attack was based on three supporting 
parts* secret societies within Vietnam were to continue the struggle; 
their power was to be increased by the development and education of 
an elite class; and the entire struggle was to be predominsjjtly 
assisted by the aid of a major foreign povjer; i.e,, Japan or China, 
Trinh, on the other hand, believed small-scale rebellions were more 
9 
coTjnter-productive than productive. The indigenous forces were no match 
for the French and rebellions only resvilted in terror and casualties for 
the Vietnamese. Further, he did not believe any third power was vitally 
interested in independence for Vietnam. Therefore, he believed indepen­
dence could only be obtained ty uniting the masses and gaining French 
cooperation. Althoiigh both leaders met with ultimate defeat, they 
continued to perpetuate the struggle for independence. 
3» In the ephemeral calm of the 1920's, especially the middle 
20's when the impetus of the past rebellions had been expanded and new 
revolutionaries were gaining momentum, the Constitutionalist Movement 
moved to center stage. They represented primarily the rich 
Vietnamese class who had acciimulated their wealth by collaborating with 
the French, While the Constitutionalists vranted political power, they 
did not want the economic apparatus altered which had benefitM them at 
the expense of the masses. They had hoped to achieve political 
collaborating with the French also, 5y working with the French, tiiey did 
not receive more political latitude, but wei*e instead used by the French 
for their own ends. The Constitutionalist Movement soon lost credibility 
and eventually their leaders were considered traitors subsequent 
revoluti ona rie s. 
The leaders of the three main movements during the "Turbxilent 
1930's" were of a new breed who had not only received Western educations, 
but also had traveled to and associated with the people in the Western 
democracies. The least significant of the three movements, the 
Revolutionary Party of New Vietnam, lacked a positive political philoso­
phy, It failed to offer an alternative type of government and basically 
10 
was only anticolonist and for the independence of Vietnam# A second 
party, the National People's Party of Vietnam, did propose a naticaaal 
government along the lines of the Chinese Kuomintang. Vftxile the National 
Party received mass support, its main flaw was the fact that it could 
not withstand the reprisal measures of the French. The third party, the 
Commxmist Party of Indochina (IGP), was by far the most effective. They 
had access to the refined techniques of revolutionaiy warfare developed 
by the Bolsheviks in Russia and later Mao Tse-Tung in China. Since 
their propaganda techniques wejre superior, they could better articulate 
the grievances of the people and then promote an IGP solution •!tihicfc» 
would fulfill the aspirations of the people. Additionally, th^ 
could endure the French suppressive tactics and then reemergew Thif^'was 
due to their advanced organizational techniques and even more important, 
their "safe-havens" in China and Russia, Here, after a BVensh 
they could regroup and reorganize their forces and train new 
replenish their depleted ranks. Because of these advantages, the 
Communist Party would have the power to profit most from the opportunity • 
which arose from World War II. 
5. After the defeat of France, during World Wfeir II, and the 
establishment of Vichy France in 19^0, French Indochina was cut off from 
her mother country and left to fend for herself. Taking advantage of 
the situaticai, the ICP organized the League for the Independence of 
Vietoam or the Viet Minh. While the Viet Minh included numerous other 
groups, like the old Nationalist Party, key positions in its hierarchy 
•were filled by members of the ICP. During the turmoil of the Second 
World Vfer and in the absence of French control, the Viet Minh were able 
11 
to organize and entrench their power in Vietnam and biiild a large guer­
rilla force which eventually defeated the French when they tried to 
reconquer Vietnam after World War II, 
The purpose of this thesis is to conceptionalize the development 
of Vietnamese nationalism by analyzing these five stages. B^/ using this 
method, it is possible to show how the impact of French infiuence 
kindled a national state of mind within the people of Vietnala, which in 
turn acted as a catalyst in fusing the common aspects of the society 
together. As the society started coming together, national institutions 
were organized to harness the powers of nationalism and i4> control its 
directicai. 
To study Vietoamese nationalism, it is first necessary to place 
the evolutionary period into a historical perspective. This is 
essential because the development of Vietnamase nationalism hag bssn 
influenced and affected by her past social, economic, and political 
conditions. Thus, the study will start with a historical overview. 
CHAPTER II 
EARLY HISTORY 
A Historical Review 
Geography and Population 
Vietnam is very unusually shaped and can be described as a 
"peasant's carrying pole with a rice basket hanging from each end." In 
the north, the fertile delta of the Red River is one of the "baskets" 
and the Ifekong River delta in the south is the other. Vistnaa oocxipies 
the Eastern coast of the Indochinese Peninsula and is about 1,000 miles 
long, extending from China south to the Gulf of Siam. At its widest 
point in the deltas, Vietnam extends over 25O miles from the borders of 
Cambodia and Laos to the sea. At its narrowest poiiit, in the cmtml 
region, Vietnam is only about 40 miles Td.de.^ 
Vietnam is approximately the size of California (127,300 square 
miles), with a population of 35»000,000, which is roughly twice that of 
2 
California, Most of Vietnam is not tillable—only parts of the delta 
regions and the very narrow plains which parallel the seacoast between 
the deltas. The rest of the country—approximately four-fifths—is 
mostly covered by a dense jxmgle and rugged mountains. The Vietnawsse 
economy is basically agrarian. Although supplemented by fish and other 
•^Joseph Buttinger, The Smaller Dragon (New Yorks Frederick A. 
Praeger, 19^)» p. 40» 
2 
Ibid., p. 22. 
12 
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vegetables, their main crop is wet rice vdiich can be successfully farmed 
only in the low plains. Therefore, almost all of the millions of 
Vietnamese are densely concentrated on a small proportion of the land. 
Vast stretches of Vietnamese territory are almost empty of people, 
others only thinly populated. Yet, in the Red River delta of North 
Vietnam, a peasant population of 6,000,000 has to feed itself on a 
territory only one-tenth the size of Iowa. In one of the northern 
provinces, the density of the rural population reaches 1,000 people per 
3 
sqiiare mile. 
This peculiar land configuration of Vietnam, coupled,with the . 
population distribution, has consistently hindered a govm-imBnt 
from establishing effective communications and controls over the entire 
land. 
The interior or undesirable land is sparsely popula^tlifj by 
ethnic minorities. Since these different groups did not giafcstantialls?; 
affect the development of Vietnamese nationalism, they will not be 
elaborated upon extensively. 
Early Development 
Like other ancient peoples, the Vietnamese have their origins 
shrouded in unknowns and legends. The record of the developm«it of the 
Vietnamese is usually divided into a legendary period ending in 258 B.C., 
a protohistorical period from that date to 111 B.C., followed by a 
historical period from 111 B.C. on. In the legendary period, there was 
a kingdom named Van-Lang which was ruled by the Hong-Bang dynasty for 
^Ibid.« p. 24. 
eighteen generations. The first Hong-Ban king was believed to have 
descended from the royal lineages of the Dragon and of the Fairies and 
was considered as the father of all Vietnamese. Hence derived the 
solemn, but coinmonly used, e:q>ression to designate the VietnaineseJ 
h 
"sons of the Dragon or grandsons of the Fairy." 
Chinese Conquest 
Historically, Vietnam has been pressured said influenced by her 
giant neighbor to the north, China, Although the early Vietnamese tribes 
then occupying an area called Nam Viet, \^ich embraced only the northern 
half of Vietnam and parts of southern China, war© periodically hai'abi^ud 
by the Chinese, it was not until 111 B.C. that China conquered siid 
Nam Viet for ten centuries. It was during this period of time that the 
Vietnamese formed a people apart from other tribes 'vdio were to be cob,-
pletely sinicized. The aim of the Chinese was to sinicize the Viet? c so 
also. But the Chinese oppressive tactics only incited the VistnasiesQ to 
band together and resist the policies of the Chinese, 
Of the different Vietnamese rebellions, two would have future 
ramifications on the development of Vietnamese nationalism. The first 
was led by the Trung sisters in 40-42 A.D.^ It began as a protest move­
ment over the murder of the husband of one of the sisters by a Chinese 
official, and then it exploded into a violent quasi-general insurrection. 
^Phan Thien Chau, "Transitional Nationalism in Viet-Nam, 1903-31" 
(unpublished Ph.D, dissertation. University of Denver, 19^5), p. 2. 
%avid G. Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism. 1885-1925 (Berkeley 
and Los AngelesJ University of California Press, 1971), p* 10. 
15 
Defeated by the Chinese after having proclaimed themselves Queens, the 
Trung sisters chose suicide instead of surrender. Future Vietnamese 
revolutionaries would regard them as the nation's first national heroes 
and would try to emulate their total commitment in the struggle for 
Independence. 
During the tenth century, the decline of the once powerful T'ang 
dynasty of China coincided with a growing political strength of Vietnam. 
In 939 a revolt sxaccessftO. in crushing Chinese occupation. China 
agreed to recognize Vietnamese defacto independence i^le retaining over 
it a nominal suzerainty. This relationship was to exist except for 
brief interruptions until 1884.^ 
Impact of Chinese Domination 
The Chinese political system ms operated by an educated 
bureaucracy which was called the mandarinate by the Suropaans. To ' 
become a mandarin, one had to pass a difficult battery of eKAiaijiations 
administered hy the government and based on the Confucian classics. In 
attempting to sinicize the Vietnamese, the Chinese were successful in 
siiperimposing this system on the Vietnamese. The Vietnamese, Confucian 
mandarinate adopted a developed legal and administrative system from the 
Chinese as well as a philosophical and religious doctrine. The 
mandarinate controlled and operated the bureaucracy from the monarch 
down to and including the district level. Only the village councils, 
which will be discussed later, remained the dominion of the peasants. 
This process, based on Confucianism, taught the people generation after 
^Chau, "Transitional Nationalism in Viet-Nam, 1903-31p» 
16 
g«i©ration "their duties to their family and to their conunxmity and 
taught them about the social hierarchy in lAiich each man had to know his 
7 place and to behave accordingly." Confusianism sought a stable and 
static society. It did not encourage independent thought, nor did it 
educate the scholar in science or stimulate his interest in philosophy. 
While the mandarin class was heavily influenced by the Chinese, 
the lower class or the peasants who composed approximately 90 per cent 
of the population were not. 
After a thousand years , . , the village of the Red River 
Valley and along the coast were still inhabited by a people 
essentially imtouched by Chinese efforts to change ar-d absorb 
them. The peasant clmg to his pre-Chinese customs and 
gious practices.® 
This durability can primarily be attributed to the fact that the 
Chinese did nothing which significantly altered the economic and social 
patterns of the peasants. They were farmers, predominantly grovars, 
living in isolated villages when the Chinese carao, and they v'srs still 
rice growers living in isolated villages vrtien the Chinese left. The 
peasant class was the foundation of the Vietnamese society, and it was 
from them that different Vietnamese leaders obtained the necessary 
manpower and strength to oppose the domination of China, 
The Village 
The phenomenon of the Vietnamese village is worthy of special 
attention. Naturally, there was some variation between the iiQrriad of 
n 
'Ellen Hammer, Vietnam Yesterday and Today (New Yorkj Holt, 
Rhinehart and lifijiston. Inc., 19^6), p. ̂ 3* 
Q 
Joseph Buttinger, Viet Mam? A Political History (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 22. 
17 
villages which dotted the Vietnamese landscape; howe-^^r, the basic 
constructs outlined below were typical of the vast majority, 
Plrst, it is necessary to delineate the political structure within 
ii^ch the village existed. At the top of the traditional Vietnamese 
governmental pyramid, power was concentrated in a few hands. Below the 
imperial covirt the largest administrative unit was the province, which 
was subdivided into districts. These first echelons were governed by 
appointed officials responsible to the central government. But beneath 
this system the governmental process changed sharply. The village, 
^riiich generally consisted of three to five hamlets, was governed by its 
own Council of Notables: 
Officials of the central govemament dealt with the 
village as a unit throiigh the village's own chosen repre­
sentatives. To the state, the village owned taxes and man­
power for military service, as well as labor on public works 
, , , , In the past, the central government determined the 
quota of payment, whether in rice, money, or xnetif sometm>es 
long after difficult negotiations with the village haadaen. 
After the quota was determined, it was up to the village 
leaders to decide how it would be met.9 
The village was surrovmded by a heavy hedge of bamboo or other 
foliation vdiich gave them protection from invaders, wild animals, and 
observation passing strangers. There was very little integration 
between villages and even less between village and district. 
The villagers were culturally and linguistically homogeneous. 
Within the village the family was the dominating institution. It was 
based on the concept of filial piety, \diich was headed by the father 
whose authority was close to absolute. Children were taught "the 
^iiammer, Vietnam Yesterday and Today« p, 216, 
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twenty-four acts of filial devotion" which was adopted from the Chinese. 
Even in death a member did not depart from his family. According to 
this concept, called ancestor worship, "death is no real departure from 
the family—one joins the ancestors to exist as an mseen but nonetheless 
11 
present member." Each member of the family, both living and dead? 
held a position within the family according to their rank. Even in the 
very limited and crowded confines of the home, the dead ancestors were 
allotted a certain space which was usually designated ly an altar. 
The Peasant 
The life of the peasant was a continual struggle for survival, Kot 
only did his small plot of land not provide any additional abundanpe in 
food, but also the Vietnamese society was a hierarchical structure. 
Taxes were not based on an idea of equality. Funds, labor, and arHy 
recruits for the central government were provided by the peasant class. 
They fatalistically accepted their position in life, pro<?idad the 
central government did not exploit them beyond their means of sustaining 
themselves. A Vietnamese proverb states, "the laws of the emperor yield 
12 to the customs of the village." 
These customs were most often violated when the central government 
became corrupt, self-serving, and not interested in the welfare of their 
people. Such a debased government would demand more from the people, 
^^Ibid.. p. 210. 
^^Gerald Cannon Hickey, Village in Viet Nam (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 196?), p. 99. 
^^Ibid.. p. 276. 
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while at the same time neglect the needs of the peasants. As the 
peasants' already meager condition would become unbeawible, they would 
revolt, regardless who the ruler was—Vietnamese, Chinese, or French. 
Expansion and Provincialism 
In the 900 years between conquerors, the Chinese and the French, 
Vietnam greatly expanded its boundaries. As ejqilained above, the 
Vietnamese were mainly a plain-dwelling, rice-cultivating, and fish-
eating people. Vfi-th their land becoming overpopulated, they needed room 
to expand. Being blocked in the north by China, in the west by inhospit­
able mountains, and to the east by the sea, the ViatKaraese could only 
find desirable land to the south. The southern region was occupied 
two highly civilized kingdoms—Champa and Cambodia, In a protracted 
struggle that lasted over seven hundred years, the Vietnamese were 
successful in defeating the Champas and the Cambodians, and by 1757 Kad 
stretched Vietnamese control over what is today Vietnam. 
A village system was used to inhabit the new lands and to perpetu­
ate Vietnamese customs: 
A system of sponsored settlement developed in which 
established villages sent out pioneers. They were usually 
yoxmg people or others without land who were eager to get new 
fields and create new villages. Support from the parent vil­
lages continued imtil the offspring were self-sxifficient. 
Then official recognition was requested from the emperor, 
who bestowed a name, a communal seal, .and a guardian spirit 
upon the new village. These imperial articles were tradi­
tionally kept in a communal home which was in effect the 
symbol of village •unity} a place for religious ceremonies 
and public occasions and in a sense a idttial link with the 
rest of the country.13 
13 
John T. McAlister, Jr., Vietnam; The Origins of Revolution 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1971)> p. 31» 
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From its independence in the tenth centuiy to 1500, Vietnam faced 
external threats ranging from several Chinese invasions to a war with 
the Mongols in 1257. However, from 1500 to 1750 the Vietnamese had 250 
years free of foreign incursions. Yet, Vietnam did not know peace. The 
central government was unstable, continually suffering from palace 
intrigues and court assassinations. The corrupt, imperial mandarin 
officials consistently mismanaged and exploited the lower class of 
people. As Vietnam moved south and the unusual lineal configui^tion of 
the country developed, the more difficult it became for the central 
government to suppress and control its new far flung territorias. Dis­
satisfied with the monarchy. South Vietnam started to identify Just with 
its own region, and a powerful trend towards provincial separation became 
a negative aspect to the development of the Vietnam Nation, 
Literature 
t\0.thstanding provincialism, in the nineteenth ceritujy the 
Vietnamese people had numerous similar qualities. In all regions they 
were attached to common national heroes, beliefs, mores, traditions, and 
langTJiage. The Vietnamese expressed their common heritage through a 
national lj.teraturo which had three levels. At the top was the scholarly 
and refined literatixre written in classical Chinese and was the main 
recorder of national history. The intermediate level consisted of 
written 3-itorature in the vernacular >;hich was easily vinderstoDd and 
expressed doep patriotic sentiments. At the lowest and most important 
lev.3l, national literature was transmitted in oral form: 
It contained, besides popular wisdom and experience, the 
legends and the stories whi'ih perpetuated among tiie widely 
21 
scattered populace a sense of historical belonging which in 
time of crisis would turn into.strong patriotism under the 
stimulus of national leaders. 
Early Contact VB.th the Vfest 
Traders. Missionaries, and Conquerors 
According to recorded Vietnamese history, the first Vfestemers 
visited their shores about 1530. TSxey were Portugese traders who were 
followed by more traders and then missionaries both from Portugal and 
l^in. In 1627 a Catholic missionary, Father Alexandre de Rhodes, 
introduced into Vietnam a system of transcribing spoken Vietnamese into 
a modified Latin alphabet. This mode of phonetic transcriptior><; called 
Quoc-ngu (literally, "Rational script"), is today the onl.y Krittsn 
vehicle used by all Vietnamese.Quoc-ngu did away with tha anGientj 
complex Vietnamese writing, which was based on Chinese characters, and 
greatly eased the spz*ead of education. 
Initiarty, rather unconcerned over the few misaionariss in Vietnasj, 
the central government became alairoed once they realized Catholicism was 
a "false doctrine." It primarily struck at the foundation of Vietnamese 
society by its stringent opposition to ancestor worship and polygaB^r. 
Generally, a missionary wotild convert an entire village or certain 
segments of one. As the villagers became indoctrinated in Catholicism, 
they tended to become alienated from the monarchy. Not only did the 
Vietnamese Christians alter their ancient social customs, but their main 
allegiance was to a God from the Vfest, 
^'^Chau^ "Transitional Nationalism in Viet-Nam, 1903-31*" P» 15* 
^^Ibid., p. 16. 
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In the three hundred years before the French conquest, the 
missionaries struggled in a seesaw battle with the Vietnamese government. 
The monarch as well as the mandarin class were aware of the dangers of 
Catholicism. The government tried to contain the movement by denying 
missionaries access into their country, by deporting others, and several 
times by more drastic action—bloody persecutions. However, the mon-, 
archy was not successful for two reasons. First, the Vietnamese 
Christians were every bit as fanatical as their Romaji counterparts. 
Persecutions did not squelch the movement in either country. Secondly, 
in times of internal upheaval, Vietnamese leaders sought Vfestem assist­
ance, the Vietnamese would concede trading privileges to the farsignals 
as well as more freedom for their missionaries. 
The last emperor of Vietnam, Tu Due (18^7-1883), instigated a 
policy of total isolation vis-a-vis the West and rigorous persecabion of 
16 
the missionaries and Vietnamese Christians. France, mider Napol8o:> 
III, was seeking a geographical base with which to counter Eritiab 
influence in the Far East. Iftider the pretext of intervening on behalf 
of the Christians in Vietnam, Napoleon III in I856 ordered his navy to 
attack the seaport of Tourane. This initiated a prolonged struggle 
between the two countries lirfiich was to last more than twenty years 
before France completely conquered Vietnam in 188^. 
Predicament of the Ruling Elite 
Emperor Tu Due lost to the French because the monarchy was in a 
state of decline, and the mandarin elite could not compete with or adapt 
^^Buttinger, The Smaller Dragon, p. Zk"), 
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to Vfestem technology. If Tu Due could have fought a prolonged guer­
rilla war against the French as the monarchy had done against the 
Mongols, he wovild have probably defeated the French. Not only xrauld the 
war have become too expensive for the French, but also the climate and 
disease vrould have dissipated their amy. But the central government 
neither had the support of the peasants nor was their coxaitry prepared 
to sustain such a war. 
The mandarin class was in a state of decay? "By being lazy as 
helpers and busy as thieves, they had created walls of hatred and 
indifference between the monarch and the masses of the peasants, #iO had 
j? 
always been the monarchy's only real source of strength." Public 
works, such as dikes and irrigation systems, were in need of repair and 
the land was not producing wliat it should. Food reseirves had been con­
sumed and the nation lacked sufficient economic wealth tc support a war. 
After Tran Himg Dao had defeated a vastly numerically superior 
Mongol army, the king asked him what sho\ild be done if the enemy should 
resume his attack. Tran stated, "The army must have one soul like the 
father and son in the family. It is vital to treat the people with 
IS 
humanity, to achieve deep roots and a lasting base." This was not the 
case in the nineteenth century Vietnam. After the unnecessary misery 
heaped upon them by the debased mandarins, the peasant felt no "deep 
roots" or allegiance to the monarchy. Although the army fought well, 
considering its weapons, it was horribly inferior to the French. The 
^^Ibid., p. 352. 
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Herculean feats which had distinguished past Vietnamese armies were not 
prevalent. 
Another problem for the mandarin elite was the challenge that 
Western influence had upon the Vietnamese Confucian society upon irfiich 
the need for the mandarin's existence ijas based. A few Vietnamese who 
had traveled to Vfestem nations told their government the only way in 
•(rtxich they could defend themselves from the West was by adopting Vfestem 
technology. This would demand a radical change in the educational 
system. The Confucian classics, the heart of the mauadarin class, would 
be replaced by scientific studies. Therefore, the laandariri class faced 
a paradoxs to save Vietnam they would have to destroy their cm class. 
Few accepted this fate; rather, most fought for the restoration of the 
monarchy and the preservation of the mandarin class. They attached the 
survival of their inadeqmte system to the survival of Vietnam, 
Thus, it i«is not merely its inferiority •w^»ich forced tfis moKa-rahy 
to sign the treaties by which it progressively abdicated its sovereignty, 
but also the obsolete and corrupt political structure. 
The Con Vuong Movement (Loyalty to the King) 
French Destruction of the Political Order 
The first region to be conquered by the French was South Vietnam. 
The French had planned on setting up a protectorate type regime in ̂ ich 
the Vietnamese, subject to French control, would continue to operate the 
administration of the area. Although the mandarins realized they were 
militarily defeated, they woiild not politically submit and cooperate 
•with the French. Instead of continuing in their administrative positions, 
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most mandarins fled to the country. Those who elected to remain and work 
for the French became targets for reprisals. As the French completed 
their conquest of Vietnam, the mandarins in Central and North Vietnam 
also abandoned their administrative positions and many of them joined 
resistance movements. 
This action of the mandarin class forced the French to assume an 
administrative role in which they lacked personnel vAio were technically 
qualified and knowledgeable of Vietnamese customs. Many positions were 
filled tiy unqualified soldiers. 
Likewise, the French t^ted to maintain the monarcl'^, but contrcl 
the actions of the emperor. However, in 1885, Emperor Hara-iKgh abandoned 
19 
his throne in Hue and hid in the movintains. Ham-Ngu was indeed a 
valuable prize for the resistance movement. Now the king had abdicated 
his throne to join in the fight for independence, Tho Fipench fervently 
sought him. They finally captured and liquidated hia in 183S. In tho 
meantime, thoxagh, the French had seated on the throns several other 
royal heirs. Consequently, the people realized that the monarchy was a 
puppet and no longer representative of the nation. 
The Nature and Methods of the Colonist 
The character of the French colonist was not that of a philanthro­
pist, but rather of a person whose main aim was strictly to accumulate 
wealth. He did not xmderstand or even cajre to vmderstand the Vietnamese 
people. The colonist laistakingly took the sober restraint and fatalistic 
attitude of the Vietnamese for weakness and ignorance. Because his 
^^Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism« 1885-1925, p, ̂ 7. 
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static society had quenched his innate initiative, the peasant appeared 
shy and vmcaring to the French. The colonist set about to accumulate his 
wealth in utter disregard for the people. 
The French grafted a modem eccsiomy onto the hitherto static and 
self-sufficient economy of Vietnam: 
The output of traditional crops~rice and com—was 
vastly increased. The northem mines were worked on a scale 
never before known in Vietnam. And the French introduced new 
crops into the country—notably rubber and coffee, ttider 
French direction, Vietnam became a large-scale exporter of 
agricultural products and raw materials.^® 
While such progress was profitable for the colonist, the peasants* 
condition became inci^asingly more diffictilt. VSiile the Srsneh oxported 
rice grown in the South, the overpopulated North lacked an adfsqaste riea 
supply. Working and living conditions in the mines and on the large 
plantations were atrocious. Since the peasant xrould not voluntarily 
leave his village for employment on the plantations or in tho uirbiss, the 
colonist procured the necessary manpower through a forced labor systemc 
According to custom, the central government collected taxes by 
levying the village as a unit and not the individuals. Violating the 
ancient rights of the village, as already explained, the colonial 
administration installed a Western tax system vdiereliy the individual was 
taxed. The colonists used taxation as a convenient vehicle to extract 
wealth from the Vietnamese society. In the past, rulers who received 
the svjpport of the masses taxed in a rational manner and used a large 
portion of the fmds to construct and maintain public works which were 
in the interest of the people. Not so with the French. Taxation was 
20 
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used to finance their administration idiich included the military, public 
offices, and public works which were generally not in the interest of 
Vietnam. The colonists wanted an improved transportation system which 
would assist them in ea^jloiting the natural riches of the land: 
It was evident to him (Governor General Doximer, 1896) 
that without roads, railroads, bridges, and harbors, Indochina's 
economy could never develop, in the peculiar sense in which it 
was a colony's duty, in order to serve its true purpose, to 
become rich.^^ 
This utter disregard for Vietnamese customs dismayed the people and made 
them deeply bitter toward the French, 
The French penal code, based on a concept of human equality, '^tiile 
utilized to govern the relationships between the colonists, did not also 
apply to the Vietnamese. Frenchmen treated their native servants and 
workers like slaves. Not only were they beaten and kicked for their own 
shortcomings, but they were also abused at times for sadistic reasons. 
As the popijlation became aware of the French attitude toward tiiem and the 
foreigner's malefic character, the Vietnamese attempted to avoid associ­
ating with or working for the colonists. 
Rebellion and Suppression 
After the Vietnamese armies had been routed and the monarchy 
defeated, resistance to the French was slow in momting. The lower 
class had been disenchanted with the monarchy, but as the abusive pro­
grams of the colonists extracted wealth and toil from them and crudely 
transgressed sacred customs, the ire of the masses was actuated. The 
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28 
people, now aware of the role of the French, held them responsible for 
the adverse conditions tinder trfiich the people sixffered. 
Most of the resistance during the Con-Vuong moveraMit was sporadic 
and uncoordinated. The resistant Vietnamese fought in guerrilla bands, 
gathered around a few notable leaders. Their attacks against the French 
were generally not very successf\il and proved to be more of an annoyance 
than a threat. However, the guerrillas did stage brutal raids upon the 
unarmed Catholic coimnunitiess •*It (the guerrillas) often indulged in 
fanatic massacres and devastation of Catholic settlements accused of 
22 
collusion or sympathy with the French." The Fi'ench, net \indei-atanditig 
the Vietnamese and considering them subhuman, reacted vdth 'iislencei 
The French easily replaced the few officers and soldiers 
killed ty the guerrillas, not retreating an inch from the 
positions their arras had won. While their strength remained 
undiminished, their hatred of the 'treacherous* Vietnamese 
increased. A vicious desire for revenge took hold of• aost 
French officers and soldiers, vented more often on tte innocent 
than the guilty.^3 
Althotagh by the end of the nineteenth century, the French had 
suppressed the Con-Vuong revolt, its spirit wotild live on» They had 
reinitiated an ancient Vietnamese tradition of opposing oppressive 
rulers; a tradition vihich future generations would follow. Amidst the 
resistance movements, two men stood out as leaders of national stature. 
One was Phan Dinh Phixng, called the '^rand Scholar of the Realm" from 
the province of Nshe An in Central Vietnam. He had led a spirited and 
amazingly successful guerrilla operation from 1886 until he died of 
99 
Chau, "Transitional Nationalism in Viet-Nam, 1903-31*" P* 31» 
23 
Buttinger, Vietnam; A Dragon Embattled, Vol.1, p. 119. 
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2.U 
exhaustion in 1895* The other was a bandit tumed patriotic rebel, 
Hoang Hoa Tham, better knovjn as De-Tham or "the Tiger of Yen-the," who 
c&rved within the highlands of northern Vietnam an impjregnable little 
en^jire, De-Tham resisted French atten^ts at pacifying him from 1886 
25 
laitil he was betrayed in 1913* 
It was evident, even to the Con-Vuong fighters, that they were no 
match for the French and stood little chance of ridding Vietnam of them# 
Cognizant of this futility, Vietnamese literature composed during this 
time reflected the movement's spirit lAich was to perpetuate their cause 
on to their posterity. A popular anticolonial sayijig of the late nine-
26 
teenth centuiy was, "If we fail, hope shifts to our sons." 
^^Chau, "Transitional Nationalism in Viet-Nam, 1903-31»" P* 31» 
^^Ibld., p. 32. 
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CHAPTER in 
THE MIDDLE CLASS MOVEMENT 
The Con-Vuong movement was not nationalistic in nature. It had 
been led by men of the regime, the "men of letters," who were supported 
by discontented peasants. A loyalist reaction had motivated the former 
to fight while the latter fought for his survival. From the beginning 
of the twentieth century, the Vietnamese society started to feel the 
results of the profomd social transformation they were xjridsr^oing, A 
small, urban class emerged; and from this dissatisfied groixp, caraa the 
leadership to cariy on the struggle for independence for the first 
quarter of the century. Even though most of the leaders of this era 
only partially understood the concepts of nationalism and its political 
potentials, they still played an important part in the evolution of 
Vietnamese nationalism. They represented a trend amy from the static 
concepts of Confucianism and a shift towards a society based on the 
dynamics of a modem society. This trend wotild further be expanded upon 
by the leaders of the 1930's. 
Creation of a Middle Class 
The colonial economy greatly altered the static character of 
traditional and ancient Vietnam. Numerous workers ware required for the 
plantations, mines, and construction projects. Their success "was paid 
30 
31 
for dearly vdth the ruthless exploitation by private French ctanpanies of 
a new sub-proletariat made up of workers uprooted, often by force, from 
the northern deltas."^ Some of these workers returned to their native 
villages, but other did not. Often under desperate conditions, these 
wandarers joined an assortment of organisations ranging from bandits to 
revolutiona ries. 
Landlordism has been a historical problem for Vietnam. Vfiien not 
protected by the central government, large landowners gobbled up the 
smaller ones. Ihider French colonialism, the growth of large estates 
began again and as usual at the expense of the peasant laajority vhtcb. 
2 
still constituted approximately 90 per cent of the population. Cns 
method both French and Vietnamese landowners used to acquire the peasant 
lands was the practice of usury. After the peasant lost his plot of 
grotaid, he would remain as a tenant fanner vAio had to pay a large por­
tion of his hairvest to the landlord. The peasants had largsly prided 
themselves in owning their own land. In the past, as the number of 
landless poor had increased, so did social unrest and violence. 
From the development of mining, agricultural exports, and the 
imports of Vfestem industry, a merchant middle class started to emerge 
in the twentieth century Vietnam. These Vietnamese obtained their status 
by working with the colonial administration, but they were frustrated. 
Economically the colons, as the French administrators were called, would 
not permit thorn to btiild a business which would challenge a French 
^Hammer, Vietnam Yesterday and Today, p. II7, 
^Ibid., p. 121. 
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competitor. Politically, the Vietnamese middle class vas even more 
stifled; basically, the French retained all political power for them­
selves. This new middle class became clearly aware that efforts to 
restore the Confucian monarchy would be in vain as well as obsolete. 
From their quest for political and intellect\jal reforms, a new generation 
of scholars influenced by Vfestem rationalism came into prominence. 
Seeking a Course of Action 
The reformists, however, faced opposition from other Vietnamese 
groups who either wanted to restore the Confucian monarch or the monarchy 
supported by a society based an science and technology. Throughout "uhe 
Far East, colonialism had stimulated a social transformation process® 
Unfortunately, Vietnam's mandarinate first looked to China for guidance 
in how to cope with the >fest: 
Being a faithful admirer of Chinese culture, Viatnsii ms 
transfixed in an iiamovable hostility toiv^rd all peoplao snd 
cultures which the Chinese considered "barbarian^" Nowhere 
else is the appellation of Vietnam as "Little China" justified 
except in its response to the Vfest. In its early stubborn 
resistance, in its reluctance to modernize in the nineteenth 
century, and in the spirit of modem nationalism, the overall 
Chinese pattern of behavior vis-a-vis the Vfest was faithfully 
replicated in Vietnam within a delay of two years to two 
decades.3 
But external events were to have momentous effects in assisting the 
cause of the refprmeie'Sy! 
Inspiration frora Abroad. In approximately three decades, Japan 
had modernized its econoay and had become a major power in the world. 
Mien she defeated China in 1895* Vietnamese and Chinese literati vho 
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previously considered the Japanese as barbarous were rudely shocked. 
The younger literati in both covintries clamored for reform. These new 
reformers translated such writings as Montesquieu, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
Garibaldi, and Mazzini into Chinese and some even into quoc-ngu. The 
next important external event was the Japanese victory over Russia in 
1905» which marked the coming of Japan among the world powers and deeply 
impressed the Vietnamese literati. The third event to affect the 
Vietnamese nationalists was the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 
in favor of the Chinese Republic. Vietnamese traditionalists who had 
based their raonarchist beliefs upon the Chinese example ware noxf without 
a political foundations "The Chinese Revolution indeed achieved the 
process of 'detraditionalization* which had begun among the Vietnamese 
literati since 1895*" 
Vietnamese Leadership 
Among the distinguished scholars who gave thrust to the initial 
reforms and continued resistance, two stood out above the rest. They 
were Phan Boi Chau and Phan Chau Trinh. Both were from Central Vietnam; 
they were fine scholars and dedicated patriots. Both had received 
traditional Confucian educations, but had expanded their education and 
were deeply influenced by their studies of V/estem philosophers. They 
were admirers of Japan's success in modernization and wanted also to 
modernize Vietnam and eject the French. However, they disagreed on the 
means which should be used to accomplish similar goals. 
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Ibid., p. 38. 
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Phan Boi Chau was an elitist and a conservative. Not only did he 
want to modernize Vietnam, but he also wanted to restore the monarchy. 
Chau believed that modernization and the revolution could only be 
accomplished by the educated elite. On the other hand, Phan Chau Trinh 
wanted to transform Vietnam into a modem state by educating the people 
and gaining their support. These two scholars were to give guidance to 
the revolution from 1900 to 1913* 
Phan Boi Chau 
At the turn of the century, Phan Boi Chau impressed and dismayed 
the French. He had won first place in the competition for seholars and 
mandarins which was held every three years, but then rejected an offer 
to enter the colonial administration. His mission in life was not, he 
told his friends, to serve as a symbol of Vietnamese readiness to coop­
erate with the French; "it was to fight foreign riil.e*"'' He went "mder~ 
ground" to organize a movement of national resistance, VJldi©- Chau 
associated with many Chinese revolutionaries, most of his inspiration 
and political concepts came from Japan. 
From 1900 to 1905> most of Chau's activities were confined to 
Vietnam. A prolific writer, his early works included a pamphlet in which 
he described "with tears and blood" the suffering and humiliation of his 
people^ and a politically defiant pamphlet titled, "Letters Written in 
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Blood." He traveled extensively thro\aghout Vietnam trying to form 
small armed groups to fight the French. He visited De Tham, "the Tiger 
•^Buttinger, Vietnam; A Dragon Embattled, Vol. 1, p. 44. 
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of Ten-the" iriio was then seriously ill, and gained his cooperation and 
support for the revolution. However, Chau believed that the French 
could only be defeated through a combined effort of the Vietnamese elite 
and assistance from a foreign power. Becoming increasingly aware of and 
impressed by the Japanese accomplishment, he planned to visit their 
country. Shortly after his arrival in Japan, the Japanese defeated the 
Russians in 1905* Elated, he wrote his countrymen that there was only 
one way for the East to assert itself against the Wests "by acquiring 
the scientific, technological, and general knowledge of the Vfest. These 
8 
are the weapons we need to regain our freedom." 
Additionally, Chau sought Japanese assistance and used their 
success to confirm his own political concepts. He returned to Vietnam 
in August, 1905* convinced that Vietnam's modernization did not require 
a political revolution. "A reformed monarchy could work the same mira-
9 
cles for Vietnam . . . that the Meiji emperors h&d wsrKed for Japan." 
Unfortunately, Phan Boi Chau had developed another misconception. He 
believed a cardinal goal of Japan vjas to free Asia from Western domi­
nance and would, therefore, support Vietnam in its struggle for 
independence. 
Vflith his notion of Japanese support, his next step was to educate 
the elite class. After obtaining permission from the Japanese govern­
ment, Chau established a recruiting system in Vietnam whereby promising 
yoving Vietnamese vrere sent to Japan to attain a \festem education. To 
stimulate a desire for studying abroad, Chau wrote two moire pamphlets, 
^Ibid., p. 50. ^Ibid., p. 150. 
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"Advice to the Yoxmg to Study Abroad" and "Letters in Blood from 
Overseas. 
Chau's constitutional monarchy was to be headed by Prince Cuong 
De, a direct descendant of Emperor Gia Long (1802-1820).^^ On his 
second trip to Japan, Chau brought with him both the Prince and Phan 
Chau Trinh. The Prince was to be an inspiration to the resistance move­
ment by establishing a government in exile and also represent Vietnam in 
dealing with the Japanese government. Trinh, Chau had hoped, would alter 
his political beliefs after seeing Japan and would support the restora­
tion movement. However, this was not to be the case. 
Although Trinh and Chau held different political concepts, thay 
respected and enjoyed each others' company. But the Prince, Cuong De, 
Trinh held in contempt. He constantly criticized the institutions of the 
monarchy and the mandarinate and told the Prince, "Even •with independenae, 
12 
we would still be miserable under the despotism." Trinh foiand tha 
Japanese educational system enlightening, but it did not change his revo­
lutionary plans. In taking leave of Chau, Trinh saids "You shoiild take 
care of yourself, for you are the hope of the nation. There is no need 
for Cuong-De."^^ 
^°Ibid., p. 150. 
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Phan Chau Trinh 
Like Phan Boi Chau, Phan Chau Tidnh also wanted to gain independ­
ence for Vietnam, but he disagreed with Chau on the tactics to be 
employed, Trinh did not believe that Japan or any other foreign power 
was going to rescue Vietnam, nor that sporadic resistance and terrorism 
were going to be effective in defeating the French, He stated that: 
There are some impulsive heroes ^riio, being either engros­
sed with history, with monarchism, or with the idea of revenge, 
sought to deceive the people by inciting them to rebellion. 
But what could a knife or a bamboo stick do? It is a tragic 
futility to present bare bodies against fatal gunfire. 
Trinh believed independence could only be obtained through enlight­
ened nationalism. He was scornful of the Vietnamese archaic education®! 
system. He wanted to develop a modem Vietnamese educational system 
which would do away with the Vietnamese reliance upcai either the Chinese 
or the French languages. The new curriculum would be written in 
Vietnamese or quoc-ngu, and would be centered around technology and 
Vietnamese history. This system, he believed, would slowly develop in 
the masses a social consciousness and political alertness which would be 
reqiiired to foster a democratic society. 
The main barrier Phan Chau Trinh*s solution faced was how to 
overcome the French. Trinh, like Gandhi, believed in nonviolence. 
Therefore, his main solution to the French problem called for a human­
istic approach. Treat the French with respect and demonstrate to them 
that the Vietnamese could govern themselves. In turn, the French were to 
reciprocate the kindness and give the Vietnamese more political latittide. 
^^Ibid., p. 110. 
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Trinh remained qidte vague as to how this approach wo\ild lead to 
ultimate independence for Vietnam. In broad terms, he explained that 
Vietnam would eventually gain a dominant political position from which 
the Vietnamese would in turn dominate the French. 
Returning from his trip to Japan, Trinh now actively engaged in 
propagating his ideas by speeches, lectures, and through articles. In 
letters to the French, he attempted to explain to them the atrocious 
conditions that they had developed, the blood that had been shed, and 
even the more blood that would be shed if conditions did not improve. 
As a solution, he offered his nationalistic concept as explained abov's, 
Vftiile several informed, humanistic Frenchmen wanted to lend iiim support, 
most did not. 
He consistently encouraged his people to improve their educational 
system and build more schools. A group of literati established th© Free 
School of Hanoi in 190?. Its aim was to impart "new leamxsig" to tha 
Vietnamese and had for a motto, "Transform the people to strengthen the 
nation.It had a broad curricultim which was designed to give students 
a general backgrotind in languages, philosophy, history, and some rudi­
ments of the sciences. Trinh, as well as other noted intellectuals, 
presented lectures at the school. Like other Vietnamese activities, the 
school was closely observe! ty the French police. The French were 
skeptical of the intent of the school and especially of its teachings on 
revolutions. In February, 1908, the colonists clos«i the school. 
^^Ibid.. p. 9^. 
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Ely coincidence, several weeks later a demonstration, which was to 
spread throughout Vietnam, occurred in Phan Chau Trinh's home area. 
Although the French claimed Trinh had instigated the revolt, it actually 
stemmed' from the policies of the French. Severe economic conditions 
were making life miserable for the masses. Although only about 200,000 
Vietnamese were necessary to supply the manpower reqtiired to run the 
lai^e plantations, nines, and construction projects, life was so diffi­
cult for these workers that a large turnover was necessaiy. After 
several years on one of these projects, a peasant would become physically 
exhausted and woiild have to be replaced. Thus, by 1908 the masses had 
become keenly aware and fearf\il of the adverse affacts of the French 
labor practices. Other extraordinary measures such as taxes were making 
life for peasants in the village equally bad: the end of February, 
I9O8, the slogan, 'Dcai't pay taxes to the French* was circulating quietly 
16 
among the peasants of Central Vietnam." 
The demonstrations which caught the colonial administration by 
surprise created fear among the French and they panicked. Just prior to 
the outbreak of discontent, the colons had been hypercritical of 
Governor General Beau because of his moderate, hmanitarian policy toward 
the Vietnamese and had forced his recall. The colonist press, irfaich was 
against reform and had been used to discredit Governor General Beau, now 
played upon the fears of the colonists: 
In the Saigon and Hanoi press, however, which without 
exception was published by fierce opponents of a liberal 
native policy, this crisis assvtmed fantastic proportions, as 
^^Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism« 1885-1925, p. 188, 
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the following lines of a French author writing about the 
period indicate: 'Every time some pirates in Tongking steal 
a few buffalo or pillage a market, certain papers stress the 
impotence of the administration. Some say that the Saigon 
reservoirs have been poisoned, Haiphong escaped a general 
massacre, treacherously prepared, only by a hair's breadth 
• • . . These false reports perpetuate a deep and lasting 
anxiety.*^7 
The colons went to the Governor- General's headquarters, where a 
provisional Governor General (Gabriel Bcmhoure) was serving, and demanded 
that the Vietnamese radicals be crushed and the leaders severely pun­
ished. Swayed by the colons, the Governor General unleashed the French 
amy >^ch applied massive fire pomr to squelch the nonviolent demon­
strations. Governor General Bonhoure also ordered the suspension of the 
normal judicial procedures and reinstituted the so-called Criminal 
Commission, "an infamous institution that was activated *rtienever the 
French, always to their surprise, ware confronted by the facts proving 
that at least some Vietnamese hated the colonial regime,^ Handrsda 
of Vietnamese were assembled before the Commission^ i'ound gitilty, and 
sentenced. 
The colons blamed the rash of demonstrations on the incitement of 
the masses by a few ambitious and irresponsible Vietnamese intellectuals. 
Phan Chau Trinh and other intelligentsia were arrested, tried for incit­
ing the riots, and for being an accomplice of Phan Boi Chau# Although 
Trinh was in no way responsible for the outbreak of demonstrations, he 
was sentenced to death. This sentence was later commuted to hard labor 
19 
in exile and Trinh was sent to a penitentiary on a remote islands 
17 
Buttinger, Vietnami A Dragon Embattled, Vol. 1, p. 65. 
^^Ibid.. p. 65. 
^^Chau, "Transitional Nationalism in Viet-Nam, 1903-31»** p. 98» 
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Setbacks for Phan Boi Chau 
Meanwhile, after initial success, Phan Boi Chau's movement for 
independence received severe setbacks. By 190? he had established a 
monarchial government in exile, was educating the elite in Japan, and 
was able to continue resistance efforts at home* But after that date, 
his fortunes abruptly changed. Japan, needing monetary assistance after 
its war against Russia, agreed to respect the possessions of France in 
Asia in return for a sizable French loan. More specifically, Jap>an 
agreed to close the Vietnamese school and deport the students, which 
took place in J\aly, 190?. In 1909 Chau and Cuong-De wei-e or-defed to 
leave the cottntry. Additionally, Chau's secret societies in ¥istoaa 
were dispersed, and many of his top lieutenants were either imprisoned 
or liquidated during the peasants' revolt of 1908, as described earlier, 
Chau and Prince Cuong-De made their way to a still ind^p'jrjdent and 
friendly Siam where Chau tried to regroup and reor^anizs his lorces. 
There he stayed until the news of the 1911 revolution in China reached 
him, whereupon he hurried off to China, 
Chau again hoped for foreign assistance in defeating the French: 
"After the revolution succeeds," he declared, "China will join Japan 
among the powers. If China and Japan joined forces to deal with the 
Europeans, not only Vietnam but also India and the Philippines would 
20 
rise up too." This statement fiilly reveals Chau's political naivete, 
in thinking that China would become a modernized and powerftil nation 
^°Ibid., p. 60, 
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immediately after her revolution and that both the foreign nations would 
work in behalf of Vietnam. 
In establishing another Vietnamese government in exile, Phan Boi 
Chau's political concepts moved closer to those of Phan Chau Trinh's. 
His republican form of government, called the Society for the Renovation 
of Vietnami, was headed President Cuong-De. Chau was Vice-President 
21 
and General Secretary. A Vietnamese graduate of the Japanese and 
Chinese military academies wrote a manual on insurrectionary warfare 
that was used by the Restoration kray. 
Through funds accmulated at home and abroad, Chau was able to 
purchase several boat loads of obsolete Japanese guns in 1912. He 
wanted to smiaggle the weapons into Vietnam and rejuvenate armed resist­
ance activities on the home front. But sporadic terrorist actions in 
Vietnam were to excite the French, who again took stringent aaasures to 
subdue the opposition. Increased boat patrols made tmauthori?.ed entry 
into the coimtry more difficult. The Criminal Commission was ordered 
back into existence: "In August, 1913» it handed dovai fourteen more 
22 
death verdicts, striking Phan Boi Chau, Cuong-De ... in absentia." 
Chau was caught ty the Chinese coiinter-revolutionary forces in 
1913 and imprisoned until I916. Like Phan Chau Trinh, with confinement 
Phan Boi Chau's active role in the resistance movement came to a close. 
Ibid., p. 61. 
?? 
Ibid., p. 63. 
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Stumnary 
During his era, Phan Boi Chau was the predominant revolutionary-
leader, His primary goal in life was to free Vietnam, In this endeavor 
he met more defeats than victories and ^lltimately failed. Perhaps he 
wotild have achieved more success if his political concepts had been in 
keeping with modem political realities. As already mentioned, his 
expectation of foreign assistance was illogical. Being an elitist, he 
formed secret societies in Vietnam which only included the tipper class 
and did not form a link to Vietnam's traditionally greatest source of 
revolutionary power—the masses. Nor was his battle to restore tha 
monarchy ever likely to have gained the fanatical but necessary support 
of the people. However, even if Chau had not had these grave political 
shortcomings, it is still highly improbable that he would have defeated 
the French. 
At this time in history, the French had too raarsy advantaged. 
Although their military force was not large, it was a well-trained unit 
trfiich had a vast advantage in weaponry over any force that the revolu­
tionaries could have hoped to field, dividing Vietnam into three 
sections, the French had established a divide and rule system which was 
consistently effective in localizing revolts,They also had an effec­
tive intelligence apparatus vrfiich did alert the French to the early 
development of resistance movements, thus permitting the colonists the 
opportTinity to crush numerous rebellions in their embryo stage, 
23 
'^The three areas of Vietnam were Cochin China (South Vietnam), 
Annan (Central Vietnam), and Tongking (North Vietnam). Cochin China was 
a French colony while the other two regions wez*e classified as French 
protectorates. 
44 
The activities of the revolutionary leaders were further impeded 
by cMumunicative barriers. Lacking current coramimication eqxiipraent and 
needing secrecy, the revolutionaries had to rely on the more primitive 
system of the messenger. Such a system was seriously deficient in 
responsiveness and timeliness. Even a regional revolt required extensive 
lateral communication in such a geographically elongated country. While 
the dissemination of information was time consuming, the adjustments 
idiich were generally necessary just prior to and during the execution 
phase were almost impossible to accomplish. Therefore, lack of modem 
communications was a primary reason for the failure of many operatdons. 
Of course, for Chau trying to lead the resistance from abroad, coHaauni-
cation was even more frustrating. Basically, he could only affect a 
revolt in its planning phase. By the time he received results from a 
rebellion in the comtry, it would be too late for him to react in a 
manner v^ich wo\ild affect the battle. Such infcrmatioa, instead of being 
cuiTent, was more like history. 
On the other hand, Phan Chau Trinh*s political concepts were more 
democratic. For the few years (I906-I908) in i^ich he tided to implement 
them, he was highly successful with the people. His approach did kindle 
a nationalistic response with other intellectuals as well as with the 
peasants. However, the part of his equation i^ich proved erroneous was 
the cooperation he sought from the colons who ran the coxmtry. While 
these people were probably tinrepresentative of metropolitan France, they 
were an exceptionally greedy group. They could not be expected to promote 
any movement vAxich did not support their own desires for wealth. Trinh 
amply learned this point from the results of the revolts of 1908, 
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Although both Phan Boi Chau and Phan Chau Trinh were released from 
prison, their effectiveness as the predominant leaders in the struggle 
for independence significantly receded during their confinements. In 
the future it woxiLd be more their prestige as patriotic revolutionaries 
and their ideas which would continue to give impetus to the stinaggle, 
rather than their actions. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE CONSTITUTICaiALISTS AND THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATia^ 
The Constitutionalists 
Although there were Vietnamese rebellions in I9I6 and 191?» they 
lacked leadership and coordination. Phan Boi Chau, idio was now out of 
prison in China, attempted to join the 191? rebelli<xi. However, it took 
him a year and a half to make his way into Vietnam, By then, to his 
consternation, the revolt had been suppressed hy tha French. 
Vlhy the Constitutionalists? 
After 1917» until approximately 192^+, there was a superficial calm 
within Vietnam. The basic social problems still existed, but the mili­
tant revolutionaries had temporarily exhausted themselves. In addition, 
the economic prosperity from World Vfeir I brought extra wealth to ths 
colons and their Vietnamese collaborators and alleviated the unemploy­
ment problem which had come into existence prior to the war. A new 
Governor General, Albert Sarrant, a liberal Radical Socialist, brought 
iB^jortant reforms to the country and further soothed the discontent hy 
promising more reforms, most of vAiich never took place.^ 
Into this indigenous, political vacuum mpved the Vietnamese upper 
class. They were the landlords who had become economically prosperous 
^Ellen Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina (Stanfordj Stanford 
University Press, 195^)» p. 78» 
kS 
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by collaborating with the French, VMle the upper class had wealth, 
they did not have political power. However, they planned on obtaining 
political representation by using the same technique they had used in 
gaining economic power: collaboration with the French. 
Their Goals and Methods 
The upper class believed that the Vietnamese could not hope to 
gain anything ty using violence in opposing the French, In the colony 
of Cochin China, from where the new reformist had their roots, the 
French had permitted an indigenous press. The reformers* strategy i«as 
to use their press to clamor for a constitution or a legal statute of 
guarantees. 
In 1923 they were allowed to form a Constitutionalist Party which 
was the first legal political organization to be formed by the 
2 
Vietnamese. Expectation of success in the early 20*s had gained for-
them much support from many nationalistic groups. But like Phan Cliau 
Trinh, the Constitutionalists were not successful because the French 
conceded little more than promises. However, the French did find it 
within their interest to use the Constitutionalists# Their decline in 
influence was reached in 1930 when their press, under French influence, 
supported the repressive action the colonists were taking against re­
newed outbreaks of armed resistance. Years later, the Viet Minh woxild 
execute the founder of the Constitutionalist Party, Bui Quand Chieu, for 
3 
being a French collaborator and a traitor to his co-ontry. 
^Ibid. 
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Since the colons woriLd not allow any legal party organization to 
effectively articulate and aggregate the political aspirations of the 
people, political parties were forced to organize clandestinely. 
Regrettably for the future of both the French and the 
Vietnamese, the structure of the French administration in 
Indochina offered no channels through which popular dis­
content could be translated into constructive political 
activity.^ 
The Social Transformation 
Before examining the Nationalistic revolutionary organization of 
the 1930's, it is necessary to amplify on the Vietnamese social trans­
formation already mentioned. By the 1930*s, colonialism had done more 
in approximately forty years to erode the Vietnamese social fiber and to 
create social instability than the Chinese had done in 1,000 years of 
conquest. 
Changes in the Social Structure 
The bureaucracy of pre-colonial Vietnam was operated by the man­
darin elite vrtio were not an economic class, but rather a political 
order. Their political authority was not obtained from wealth or 
privileged birthrights, but rather through academic achievements. 
According to Confucianism, the mandarin was supposed to live a frugal, 
humble life, "If a mandarin was rich, the source of his wealth was 
invariably the use and abuse of his political power. When corruption 
of the mandarin class became widespread, social customs would be violated 
^Ibid., p. ?9. 
^Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, Vol. 1, p, i6i, 
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and the peasants wovild be exploited. The peasantry would become enraged 
and social instability and revolts would ensue. In fact, one of the 
most important functions of a mandarin was to prevent social unrest by 
protecting the peasants from abusive economic practices. 
IMder the colonist, political power merged with economic self-
interest. Not only were the new conquerors mainly concerned with 
acquiring riches, but most of them did not even care what was the fate 
of the indigenous people. The few Frenchmen who did express concern for 
the natives were belittled and scorned as •'native lovers." VB.th such 
goals and attitudes, a colonial administrative apparatus -Khich Piitmsed 
and mistreated the people as they had never known came into existence* 
Within this organization there was no one or any institution which pro­
tected the natives from the new economic forces unleashed. 
Due to the economic practices of the French (e.g., Vfesterrt 
technology and management methods), social classes esaergod tn Vieaiam 
6 
for the first time. But, of the more than 1?.? million Vietnamese vAio 
inhabited Vietnam in 1931» only 0.5 per cent belonged to the privileged 
upper class, 9»5 per cent to the middle class, and 90 per cent to the 
7 
exploited lower class. Of the 3»000 colonial administrators vdio domi­
nated the Vietnamese social stmicture, political authority remained in 
g 
the hands of about 10 per cent of them. The center of economic power 
^"In the sense in i^ch the classes of modem society are defined 
by economic function and property relations, precolonial Vietnam was not 
class society, or rather, it was a society consisting of one single class 
(peasants) ruled by an educated bureaucracy (mandarins)." Ibid.« p. 160. 
n 
McAlister, Vietnam; The Origins of Revolution, p. 66. 
^Ibid., p. 74. 
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and political influence was the French-owned Bank of Indochina, the 
large landowners, and mining firms. 
Methods of the French 
VB.thin the colonial system only the Governor General was a 
professional administrator, representing the interests of the French 
Government. Of the rest, most had not been trained in administration, 
and their allegiance was to the French economic controlling power. It 
is significant to note that after the conquest had been completed, the 
Governor General rapidly lost political power and influence to the non­
professional, but permanently entrenched administrators, Througli proper 
utilization of the colonial press and support of certain French mstro-
politan politicians who generally had vested interests in Vietnam, the 
colons were able to effectively neutralize the institutional authority 
of the Governor General. In 1908 the colons had succeaded having the 
moderate, hiomanitarian Governor General replaced by tho sicre stem totoni-
Wladislas Klobukowski. Initially pleased with the repressive measures 
he took against the revolutionaries, the colons became unhappy when he 
also took firm steps against their odious practices nji treating the 
natives and their unfair business monopolies. The colonists wanted a 
Governor General who would both keep the "natives in their place" and 
enforce conditions under vMch monopolies and other irresponsible 
businessmen could exploit the Vietnamese people as they pleased: 
When Klobukowski failed to fulfill this latter part of 
his duty, his usefulness to colonial society was at an end. 
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angry compatriots succeeded in having him recalled after a 
mere sixteen months in office.^ 
Prior to 1900, Indochina had been an expense rather than a profit 
for the French Government. France demanded that the colony pay not only 
for itself, but also for the amy of occupation as well, VMle histori­
cally the Vietnamese had preferred direct taxes^ the French instilled 
their owi system of indirect taxation. The tsost notorious indii^ct taxes 
were collected on salt, opium, and alcohol. To prevent the people from 
circumventing the new taxation laws, monopolies were formed on these 
three items, and they cotild only be purchased froia licensed colons and 
Chinese dealers. However, the Governor General lost control of thc-sa 
dealers and their insatiable greed for wealth knew no lirdts. 'ivhon the 
cost of alcohol became prohibitive for the masses, forced sales were 
affected by threat to penalize communes that did not buy. W3.th the rire 
in the cost of salt, consumption dwindled, producing a bad effeet -apon 
the health of the natives.Opium was sold in a siiailar manner, 
Althoijgh the monies obtained from these monopolies did assist in making 
the colony solvent, they created a hatred in the people vjhich would have 
grave consequences. 
How It Worked 
Within the in-countiy economic-social pyrariiid^ a working relation­
ship evolved between the various classes. This t"elatlonsh;ip had a basic 
creed: as long as production goals were met, no questions would be 
asked. The Vietnamese middle class was involved in the operation of 
^^Virginia Thompson, French Ij:do-Ciuna (New Yorkj The Macmillan 
Company, 1937)> pp» 186-8?. 
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some small shops, low administrative positions, and as foremen for the 
large plantations, mines, and public works. These Vietnamese foremen, 
called cai« had almost absolute authority over the workers and showed 
little compassion for them. The cai not only mistreated them, but also 
imposed fines and charged them for some alleged services. Often the 
poor worker would end up heavily in debt to the cai. Since the cai was 
also a recruiter, he had to search the countryside for laborers. How­
ever, as the pop\ilace became aware of the laborer's fate, they would 
desert their village at the approach of a traveler, "vho might have a 
11 
permit to reqidsition assistance." As recruiting became more difficult, 
the cai discovered that the most favorable conditions for hiring were to 
be found in regions hit by famine. 
Snail shops, such as pawn shops, opim shops, gambling houses, and 
grain mills, were a common feature to most villages. Although sortie 
Vietnamese operated these shops, this was an area doojinated by an aggres­
sive, exploiting Chinese minority. The Chinese were a clannish group 
who did not seek political, but economic power. It is said that they 
12 
"did not care who held the cow as long as they got to milk her." 
Therefore, their loyalty was to the political power triiich best enhanced 
their earning capabilities. They gladly cooperated with the French for 
the privilege of dealing with the people without governmental inter­
ference. 
^^Ibid.. p. 73. 
12 
Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia (London! Oxford 
University Press, 1965), p. ̂ 62. 
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The land policies of the colonists in Vietnam, even more than the 
taxes, monopolies, and businesses they introduced, reveal the major 
source of discontent for the people who would later provide the strength 
for revolutions. 
For more than tvo thousand years before the coming of the 
French, the well-being or misery of the people depended chiefly 
on vAiether sufficient land was available, ̂ ^ether the cultivable 
area increased with the growth of population, and equally impor­
tant, how much of the product of his labor the peasant was allowed 
to keep.^^ 
The colons ascertained that the most efficient way to increase rice 
available for export was to increase the acreage of the large landowners. 
Employing methods already mentioned, the French furthermore deemed that 
they had inherited all the land from the monarchy. Vfliilo this was in 
accordance with an ancient, but not utilized statute, the colonists by 
using it were in fact violating Vietnamese customs. The numerous wars 
and civil wars in many provinces had frequently driven the paasants from 
their land. In their absence, their land was cheaply sold, to colons and 
wealthy, well-behaved Vietnamese. When the displaced peasants, usually 
long after fighting had stopped, returned to their fields, they dis­
covered their lands belonged to someone else. Those few vdio insisted 
the land still belonged to them were charged with breaking the law and 
treated as thieves. Most of the peasants, having no other realistic 
option, decided to work the land for the new owners. As tenants, they 
had to give, generally, at least half the crop to th® landlord. 
During the pre-colonial times, the export of rice had been for­
bidden. Surplus rice was to be sent either to deficient regions or 
13 
Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled« Vol. 1, p. 162, 
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stored for times of poor harvests. The colonist saw rice exports as a 
way to quick riches. Colonial irrigation projects in western Cochin 
China opened up vast territories for farming. The new lands were sold 
to the wealthy French and Vietnamese who wo\xld produce more rice for 
exports rather than having the land distributed to the multitude of 
needy peasants. 
The efficiency in the production of rice the colonist saw in the 
large landlord was not in techniques or methods of farming, ̂ ich 
remained the same, but rather in their ability to take more rice from 
the peasants. This system was brutally efficient. By 1929 Vietnaia was 
e:q)orting some 1,^72,000 metric tons of rice, which made it the third 
largest exporter of rice in the world. In the rice bowl on the Mekong 
Delta, 45 per cent of the cxiltivatable land was in the hands of 2 per 
cent of the landholders. Out of an estimated rural populatioti of 
4,000,000 in the Mekong Delta, more than half were tenants ox- landless 
i5 
agricultural laborers. 
At times the Governor General, becoming aware of the plight of the 
people, tried to curb the trend of large landlordism. To undercut the 
usviry practices of the landlords, the Governor General sponsored a loan 
program for the peasants charging reasonable rates. However, the pro­
gram did little to aid them because the loans had to traverse the 
colonial social-economic pyramid. In oi^der to make a profit, each level 
^^Bemard B. Fall, The Two Vietnams (New Yorks Frederick A. 
Praeger, 196?), p. 294. 
^^McAlister, Vietnam8 The Origins of Revolution, p. 65. 
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increased the rate of interest. Instead of helping the peasants» the 
loan program merely added more wealth to the already rich. 
Education and the Depression 
During the 1920's and 30*s, the colonial regime adopted a more 
liberal attitude toward education for the Vietnamese. This applied 
mainly to the upper class vrtio could afford to educate their children in 
France. The colonists thought education would enhance their image. A 
French education would make the Vietnamese aware of their lowly stature, 
and natives educated in France would return espousing French culture to 
l6 
their countrymen. But, the colons were to be disillusioned. 
In Prance, the young Vietnamese studied Vfestem democratic concepts 
and ejqjerienced life under conditions of more political freedom and 
equality before the law than they had known in Vietnam. Upon returning 
to their homeland, they could not obtain employment consiwriaerate with 
their education, and they vers continually treated as inferiors by all 
colons. "For the intellectuals of Vietnam, lihether educated abroad or 
at home, foreign rule therefore was harder to bear than for the economi-
17 
cally exploited rural and ui^ban masses." 
The intellectuals jealously continued to observe how Japan had 
successfully modernized, maintained her independence, and become a major 
power. The Russian Revolution and the political concepts of its leaders 
were being studied by other Vietnamese from the educated ranks. Then, 
in the 1930*s, another external event was to have repercussions in 
16 
Thompson, French Indo-China, p. 297, 
17 
Buttinger, Vietnam; A Dragon Embattled. Vol. 1, p. 203. 
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Vietnam. The prosperity iidiich World War I and its aftermath had brought 
to Vietnam came to a smashing halt as the country felt the effects of 
the depression* 
The catastrophe of the depression hit the villagers from several 
directions. Their meager rations had to be further shared with the 
thousands of jobless laborers >rtio had been laid off. As the demands for 
exports dropped, some colons attempted to offset their monetary losses 
by increasing taxation of the masses. Instead of facing only malnutri­
tion, the peasants now knew starvation. 
By the early 1930*s, Vietnam had become fertile grovnads for a 
revolution. The masses were desperate and frantically searching for a 
social order which wo^lld meet their basic needs. The wealthy and educa­
ted felt politically stifled and cheated by an arrogant and unscrupulous 
foreign conqueror. From abroad, they saw how Japan had ccaitainsd 
Western influence and how Russia had conducted a successftil revolution* 
From the unstable and dissatisfied Vietnamese society new revolutionary 
movements emerged. 
CHAPTER V 
THS TURBULENT 1930'S 
The failure and loss of prestige of the Constitutionalists in the 
late 1920*5 coincided with the increased activities among revolutionary 
organizations. The leaders of these new organizations had grown up dur­
ing the First World War and were trained in French schools, deriving 
most of their political ideas directly from Wsstemers themselves. 
There were three primary movements: the Vietnam Quoc~Dan Dans (Mational 
People's Party of Vietnam, hereafter VNQDD), the Vietnam Thanh-Nien" 
Cach-Mang Dong Chi Hoi (Vietnam Revolutionary Youth Associaticai, here­
after Thanh-Nien) succeeded in the end by the Dong-Duong Cong-San Dang 
(Indochina Conuaunist Party, hereafter the ICP), and tha string of 
successive organizations known generally as the Tan-'/iet C&ch-Mang;^ SanR 
(Revolutionary Party of New Vietnam, hereafter Tan-Viet). 
Ho Chi Minh and the Commimist Movement 
The historical development of the Communist Party in Vietnam was 
synonymous with the activities of Nguyen Tat Thanh, who was bom, circa 
1890, in the rebellious province of Nghe An in North Central Vietnam.^ 
Thanh was to become well known to the colonist by the alias Nguyen Ai 
^Besides being the home of nvimerous ancient revolutionaries, such 
modem movement leaders as Phan Boi Chau and Phan Dinh Phung were also 
bom in Nghe An. Hence, it has been called, "the cradle of revolution­
aries." 
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Quoc (Nguyen the Patriot), and later he became internationally known 
mder another alias. Ho Chi Minh. 
Thanh's father was a famous mandarin scholar vrtio had been fired 1:^ 
the colonists because of his nationalist sympathies. Influaiced ty his 
father, as well as the leaders of the various patriotic resistance move­
ments, Thanh grew up with the goal of freeing Vietnam. Around 1911-1912, 
he cut short his secondary studies and took a job as cabin boy aboard a 
French commercial liner. He traveled to Europe and allegedly to the 
IJbited States. Thanh was startled to discover that the proletariat was 
being exploited worldid.de. l^on reaching France, whore ha vss to romain 
for several years, Thanh became familiar with an Asian anticolonialist 
group, among whom was the legendary Phan Chau Trinh. Trinh and Thanh 
became friends, with the former introducing the latter to members of the 
French Socialist Party and by giving Thanh the name of Mguyen ili Quoc, 
Nguyen Ai Quoc Becomes a Communist 
Perhaps nothing fired up the imagination and hopes of the 
Vietnamese intellect\ials more than did the inspiring words of the 
President of the United States in his Fourteen-Point Message. If "self 
determination of peoples" was to become a reality, then Vietnam would no 
longer be a conquered land. Quoc, assisted by Trinh, composed a docu­
ment petitioning the major powers for the right of the Vietnamese people 
to self-determination. Quoc unsuccessfully attempted to present the 
document at the Versailles Peace Conference. He discovered that the 
Western diplomats had little time or interest in Vietnamese grievances 
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or desire for autonomy. He later said, •'Liberty, eqtiality and fraternity, 
2 
although real enough in France, apparently were not for export." 
As a member of the French Socialist Party, in 1920, Quoc attended 
one of their meetings in lAich they discussed the question of whether the 
French Socialist Party should remain in the Secc»id International, shovild 
a Second-and-a-half International be founded, or should the Socialist 
Party join Lenin's Third International? Quoc wanted the French Socialist 
Party to join the latter because Lenin had taken a position favorable 
for the colonized peoples. During the proceeding Quoc stateds 
I do not understand strategy, tactics, all theso big 
words and techniques you are discussing. I nevertheless •under­
stand vrell one thing, namely that the Third Intematicnal caros 
a great deal about the colonial question. Its delegates proai-
ise to help the colonized peoples to regain their freedoa and 
independence. The members of the Second International have not 
said a word on the fate of the colonial lands.3 
After the meeting, Quoc and other members of the Socialist Party favoring 
the Third International banded together to fom the French Cormaunist 
Party. 
Thus, disillusioned by Vfestem diplomats, Nguyen Ai Quoc had turned 
to political concepts of Marx and especially Lenin, From the Russian 
Revolution, the Communists had further refined the art of revolutionary 
warfare. Now, Quoc had become a member of a system which, if effectively 
adopted, would enable him to organize and control the capabilities of 
his country against the alien minority. 
2 
Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina, p. 75» 
3 
Chau, "Transitional Nationalism in Viet-Nam, 1903-31»" P» 218. 
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For the next several years, Quoc actively participated in the 
Communist Party in both France and Moscow vrtiere he received extensive 
training. Then, in 19^5» he was sent to Canton where he assumed his most 
famous alias, Ho Chi Minh. As a cover, he xas sent as a Chinese trans­
lator for Comrade Borodin, the Comintern's envoy to the Chinese 
Revolutionary Government. But Ho*s real purpose was to organize the 
k 
sizable group of Vietnamese exiles vriio lived in Canton. He accom­
plished this task tsy establishing the Thanh Nien (Association of Vietnamese 
Revolutionary Youth), The Than Nien's blueprint for a revolution which 
would defeat the French consisted of three main points as defined by Ho 
Chi Minh: 
1. The revolution is a task for the broad working class and 
peasant masses, not for a hsuidful of men. Hence the need 
to organize the masses. 
2. . The revolution must be directed by a Marxist-Leninist 
Party. 
3. The revolutionary movement in every comtry must be in 
close touch with the international proletariat. Action 
must be taken to ensure that the working class and the 
toiling masses are able to distingtiish the Third 
International from the Second.5 
Organization and Methods of the Thanh Nien 
Vietnam was to be organized into a hierarchy of cell committees, 
pyramiding upward from village sections through sections representing 
larger administrative units and culminating in a central directing 
^Jean Lacouture, Ho Chi Minht A Political Mogiraphy, trans, by 
Peter Vfiles (New York: Alfred A. Knoph, Inc., 1968), pp. 46-47. 
^Ibid.« p. i+9. 
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6 
committee. The base of the pyramid, being the most important, was to be 
constructed first. Party members trained in Canton were secretly sent 
back to Vietnam to organize the villages into a cell system. By 192? a 
force of 200 highly trained, motivated, and dedicated cadre members were 
7 busy at work. 
Cadre members were not assigned to just any village; they were -
sent back to their own village. Their first step was to establish them­
selves within the community, and through informal inqtiiries, leam the 
grievances and aspirations of the inhabitants. In these discussions, 
the cadre man would identify and develop a close friendship with the 
most discontented and dissatisfied members of the coiasiiinity. 
the party representative would bring selected ones within his confidence; 
and, finding them amendable, he would teach them the methods of Communism. 
Then, they would become his cadre members. In future discussion, the 
cadre men would subtly blame the French and the members of tVie landloid 
class, vho were called "running dogs of the French," for their griev­
ances and for the stifling of their aspirations. As hatred for the 
French mounted, so did a nationalistic spirit that demanded independence. 
The cadre cells worked to harness the power and spirit of nation­
alism. They told a responsive comraimity that everyone had a job to 
perform in the struggle for freedom and that the village had to organize. 
Peasants, workers, women, and youth were all placed within an organiza-
8 
tion that was controlled by the cadre. The people were never told 
hammer, The Struggle for Indochina, p, 80, 
"^Fall, The Two Vietnams, pp. 92-93* 
^Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina, p. 249, 
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their stmggle was for Communism; the revolution was alvays for the 
abolishment of colonialism and the creation of an independent Vietnam. 
This system was effective because it dominated and completely 
controlled the individual. The organizational committees permitted 
spying on the family. Children were separated from their parents as 
well as parents from each other. During meetings, all were told of 
their different responsibilities, vdiich included informing on aryone 
committing an act against the independence movement. Generally, 
offenders were warned for minor offenses. Then stronger action, includ­
ing death, was administered for repeaters or for major crimes. 
According to Communist organizational techniques, leaders of a 
movement were supposed to conceal their identity. In the haste and 
immaturity of the first cell leaders of the Thanh Niai, this point was 
carelessly neglected and eventually led to the destruction of many cells 
during the reprisals of the 1930's. However, those leaders who had 
followed the principle, and future cells leaders who had learned by the 
costly mistakes of their predecessors, implemented this principle of 
concealment an organizational scheme. 
Prior to a meeting, the leader instructed his subordinates as to 
the direction and aims he wanted the meeting to obtain. Then, during 
the meeting his lieutenants, dispersed among the people, controlled the 
direction and tempo of the gathering. The cadre tried to make the affair 
appear as a spontaneous reaction. As a meeting unfolded, it was diffi­
cult to observe if a rebellious statement was made by a cadre member or 
by an emotional peasant giving vent to his frustrations and misery; and 
the prodding and comments necessary to ignite the spirit of vexation was 
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done by the cadre lieutenants. All the while, the cell leader incon­
spicuously observed. His main task was planning and organizing the 
event. The people and his subordinates carried out his plan. 
Ifthile the majority of the villagers supported the Thanh Nien, 
there were generally some, who for different reasons, did not. How­
ever, once the Thanh Nien or its successors (they will be introduced 
later) established their organi'zational system within a village, it 
became almost impossible for aryone to organize a coiantemioveraent. 
Thus, the village cell structure was powerful and successful 
because it aggregated the hopes and desires of ths peopla^ and &t the 
same time, it stifled deviation or opposition* As the organisation was 
perfected, later French attempts to crush it met with frustraticsi since 
the leadership was not popoilarly known by the people. 
The Tan Viett Success and Defeat 
In Central Vietnam, the Thanh Nien movement was contested hj ths 
Tan Viet, The least influential of the three revolutionaiy organiza­
tions of the era, the Tan Viet was formed in 1926 in North-Central 
9 
Vietnam, but had completely disappeared four years later. ̂ It was a 
follow-up to the Phan Boi Chau movement. Like Chau, the Tan Viet did 
not have a concrete program of social reforms and political actions to 
offer to the masses. The leaders believed independence first had to be 
achieved before Vietnam could be restructured. Not seeking the support 
of the masses, the movement attempted to revive and reorganize the old 
%cAlister, Vietnawt The Origins of Revolution, p. 78. 
secret societies of Phan Boi Chau, Most of its members were from the 
new middle class—journalists, teachers, subaltern ftmctionaries, and 
small proprietors—with an insignificant representation from the lower 
class* 
The Tan Viet became intrigued with the success and effectiveness 
of the Thanh Nien. The politically unseasoned leaders of the former 
though a merger would enhance the overall struggle for independence. 
However, they expected their political concepts as well as their person­
nel to be represented in the new organization. Although Ho Chi Minh 
agreed in principle to the consolidation of the two O]?gan3zatiof^^ j it was 
nothing more than a Thanh Nien political stratagem to dissolve tlie fan 
Viet. It was a maneuver Ho perfected and used extensively, whereby he 
would absorb another organization by giving its leaders positions with 
10 
impressive titles, but no authority. Thus, from the 192? of 
the Tan Viet and the Thanh Nien, only the latter reamerged. 
Disenchanted with the merger, certain leaders of the Tan Viet 
tried to reform the movement. To counteract their efforts, the Thanh 
Nien informed the colonial police agency, the Surette, of the membership 
of the Tan Viet. Knowing that it was not a threat to the French, the 
Surette merely kept the Tan Viet tmder observation until the 1930's. 
Then, in the process of suppressing a rebellion, the French were 
imprisoning the members of any revolutionary movement—which included 
the jremaining members of the Tan Viet, 
^%ouglas Pike, Viet Cong (Cambridge? The M.I.T. Press, 196?), 
p. 27. 
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Problems for the Thanh Nien 
Internal and external events affecting Vietnamese resistance move­
ments became highly complex after 1925# Changes in China forced the 
Thanh Nien Directing Committee to relocate several times, further pre­
cipitating a split vdthin the Communist hierarchy. At the same time, 
within Vietnam the Thanh Nien and the Vietnam Nationalist Party (VNQDD), 
^Adch was founded in 192?, were both achieving considerable success. 
In 1927 Chiang Kai-Shek decided to eliminate, in a surprise attack, 
the Chinese Communists in his Kuomintang coalition. Communism was out­
lawed. The Russian advisory detachment fled for home, and Ho and the 
Thanh Nien Directing Committee relocated to Wuchow. Sut continuing 
pressure by the Right-Vfi.ng of the Kuomintang further forced the Directing 
Committee to re-establish itself in Hong Kong in 1928. Since Ho had 
become a prime target of the surging anti-Coxnm'unist attack, he abandoned 
the Thanh Nien and allegedly traveled to Moscow, leavir^g the Party lunder 
the supervision of subordinates. Because they were not able to agree on 
policy, a major rift within the Directing Committee occurred. 
Disagreement and Division 
The Thanh Nien held their first and last National Congress in Hong 
11 
Kong in May, 1929* The purpose of the meeting was to adopt a charter 
and a program of action Ti^ch would be in line with the directives of 
the Sixth Congress of the Comintern. A staunch Commimist ideological 
group moved to have the Thanh Nien renamed the Communist Party of 
Indochina, but the motion was voted down by the lai^er moderate group. 
^^Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina, p. 80. 
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The moderates believed the new title would alienate ricai-Coraraunist support 
as well as further provoke the Kuomintang, Angered over the actions of 
the moderates, three important delegates from the Nojrth walked out, 
charging the Thanh Nien as nothing but "a group of clever little bour-
12 
geois vrtio practice socialism and promote false revolutions." They 
went home and established the Communist Party of Indochina in the north-
em region of Vietnam, 
The remaining members of the Thanh Nien continued their meeting. 
About July, 1929, they finally sent their program to the Executive 
Committee of the Comintern with the expectation of acceptance. The 
Party was denied recognition by the Comintern and sharply rebutted again 
for being "too petty bourgeois." At approximately the sarae time, the 
Directing Committee was startled vdien they learned of the success of the 
Communist Party of Indochina, Not only had most of the Thanh Nien 
organization in the North joined the new movement, but also colls from 
Central Vietnam were joining. A similar process took place in the South 
as that branch of the Thanh Nien was redesignated the Indochinese 
Commxinist Federation, Panicked and embarrassed, the Directing Committee 
in Hong Kong decided to rename the Thanh Nien in the central region, 
which they still controlled, the Annamese Commmist Party. 
Thus marked the end of the Than Nien, as it now had been completely 
shattered along regional lines. This fragmented condition of the 
Communist movement was to remain until Ho Chi Minh returned and reunited 
the Party in 1930. 
12 
Chau, "Transitional Nationalism in Viet-Nam, 1903-31»" P« 22^, 
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The VNQDD 
Political Concepts 
In Tongking, in the mesuitime, the creation of the Vietnamese 
Nationalist Party, VNQDD, had taken place in 1927* Its founding fathers 
were young intellectuals who had received Wastemized educations and 
were deeply influenced by events after World Wkr I. Impressed by 
President Olson's ideas of national self-determination, the Russian 
Revolution, and the various anti-colonial movements, the VNQDD wanted 
independence for Vietnam. But mlike the Tan Viet, the VNQDD had a pro­
gram idoich was more than just anti-colonialism. The party was national­
istic in concept and wanted to establish a republican type government, 
13 
modeled along the linos of the Chinese Kuomintang. 
A New Strategy 
To free Vietnam and gain power for itself, tha WQDD foriniilateti a 
strategy that consisted of four stages of action. The first wajj a clan™ 
destine period of recruitment and organization. Then would come a 
relatively secret period of preparation which woiild include military 
training, intelligence gathering, and the procurement of ammunition and 
foodstuffs. Overt revolution was to come next. Miile the VNQDD 
believed French rule must be overthrown by force, their approach was 
new 
What they had in mind was a military coup. Nationalists 
in the armed forces recruited from among the Vietnamese were 
13 
Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina, p. 82, 
lii 
Chau, "Transitional Nationalism in Viet-Nam, 1903-31»" p. 208, 
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to lead the native soldiers against their French coimnanders, 
occupy the main towns of the country, unseat the French resi­
dents, overwhelm the foreign contigents of the army, and 
install a nationalist regime , , , it also prepared its 
civilian followers for such military action through the manu­
facture of bombs and the stockpiling of arras. 
Of course, the last stage would be the establishing of their republican 
government. 
Organization« Success« and Defeat 
The VNQDD had its headquarters in Hanoi. While the party member­
ship represented both rural and urban people from all three classes of 
the Vietnamese society, the core of it was based on the urban educated 
middle class. Patriots from the rich upper class added needed fiiiiuncial 
aid. Because of the party's strategy, the recruitment of the Vietnamese 
soldiers had a high priority. The Nationalist Party grew fast durjjig 
its first two years. 1928 it had already gained more sympathy and 
support among the Vietnamese middle class than any previous nationalist 
movement. The following years, the VNQDD*s success kes even more aston­
ishing. Inspired by the policies and initial growth of the VNQDD, 
nmerous local and regional secret societies joined ranks. "Both the 
membership and the funds of the party increased. In 1929, the French 
Surette estimated that in Tongking alone the party had 120 cells, with 
about 1,500 members, 
Like the Thanh Nien, the VNQDD had been careless in concealing its 
identity and had inadvertently admitted informers into the party. When 
^%uttinger, Vietnam? A Dragon Embattled« Vol. 1, p. 20?. 
^^Ibid. 
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the VNQDD assasinated M. Bazin^ the colonial head of the hated labor 
foremen or cia, February 1929i the Surette quickly responded--raiding 
the party's headquarters, capturing informative documents, and then 
17 
arresting 229 members of the VNQDD. The French were shocked idien they 
discovered at laast half of the party's members were on the payroll of 
the French administration. 
A Poor Decision and a Disastrous Rebellion. For the remaining 
months of 1929, the VNQDD came under the mounting pressure of the 
Surette, "The police uncovered some VNQDD arsenals and they were on the 
18 
trail of a number of members." The leader, Nguj'sn Thai Hoc, fciio like 
most of the party's members was under 30 years of aga, decided the best 
course of action was to declare a full-scale revolution before the 
colonists' repressive acts depleted his forces. Lacking effectiveness 
in communication id.th, and control over his five regional subordinates, 
the rebellion proved to be disastrous for Hoc and the VIJQBD. 
According to the attack plan, Vietnamese soldiers in the major 
garrisons throughout northern Vietnam were to spearhead the attack dur-
19 
ing the lunar New Year holiday (Tet) on the night of January 3^* 1930. 
But the plan was compromised when the police seized leaflets bearing the 
proclamation of the revolt. Hoc ordered the revolt delayed taitil 
February 9, 1930. However, one of his five regional lieutenants could 
not be contacted; and therefore, Hoc ordered another postponement of the 
^"^McAlister, Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution, p. 80. 
18 
Hammer, The Strangle for Indochina, p. 83. 
^^Chau, "Transitional Nationalism in Viet-Nam, 1903-31»" p* 210. 
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attack. This time, thoiigh, one of his regional chiefs became impatient, 
and he decided to ignore the second postponement order and mount the 
attack. The attack caught both sides off guard, "On February 9» 1930, 
two coiiq>anies of Vietoamese troops garrisoned at the hill town of Yen 
Bay revolted, killing three French officers, two NCO*s and five loyal 
Vietnamese before they were overwhelmed by loyal troops aided by Fraich 
20 
reinforcements. '• 
Sensing imminent danger, Hoc and his staff fled Hanoi for the 
country vAiere he attempted to organize another attack. But he did not 
have a chance. In typical fashion, the French army aiid polifBa mowr^tsd a 
savage, repressive campaign. Army patrols saturated the Gblffltrysid© .iji 
areas in which party members might have sought refuge. In response to 
any opposition, the army used indiscriminate and massive fire power; 
including for the first time the bombing of a village, iiguyen fhair Hoc 
as well as most of the party members were captured in the a^ssi-ve 
arrests. 
Supreme Patriotism and the End of the VNQDD, Sentenced to the 
guillotine along with twelve of his lieutenants. Hoc left these fighting 
words for the future of nationalism} 
Tife are going to pay our debt to the fatherland. You vrtio 
live just keep on with your tasks. The independence flag must 
be dyed with blood; the flower of liberty must be watered with 
blood. The fatherland will need a great deal more sacrifice 
from its children! the revolution will one day triumph1^1 
20 
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With the death of its top leaders and long prison terms for many of its 
members, the VNQDD ceased to be an influential force within Vietnam dur­
ing the 1930*s. The few remaining stragglers settled in China along the 
boundary of Vietnam, But not until the Second World Vfe,r did they have 
the opportunity to return to Vietnam and rebuild their pajrty. 
The Communist Movement 
The Comm'unists opposed the nationalist movement led by the VNQDD. 
In fact, one of the resolutions in the program the Thanh Nien formulated 
in their 1929 national congress stated: "The staunchly Nationalistic 
92 
Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD) must be fought absolutely®The iistej-nal 
problems the Communists were experiencing as well as cthsr circumstances 
had prevented a confrontation between the two movements. However, with 
the French destruction of the VNQDD, the Communists now controlled 
center stage of the resistance effort. 
Divided But Still Successfxil 
EJven though the Communist Party became fragmented along regional 
lines in the late 1920's, it continued to expand and to gain influence. 
Utilizing propaganda techniques developed by the Coaintem, the 
Vietnamese Communist Party was able to reach the people. Under the 
Thanh Nien, a paper by the same name had been published and smuggled 
into Vietnam, The paper, similar to other propaganda endeavors, stayed 
away from Marxist doctrines and bespoke of a nationalistic cause. Ho 
knew well enough that the audience he must reach consisted in the main 
^^Ibid., p. 226, 
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of tradition-bound peasants who wo\tLd be skeptical of a new doctrine, but 
desperately needed help: 
The masses were land-httngry, debt-ridden, maltreated and 
repeatedly exposed to long periods of starvation. Here, at 
last, was somebody (The Communist Party) who spoke of their 
misery and of the fight for independence in terms that had 
meaning also for the poor ... .^3 
An indoctrination program vrtiich was greatly assisted by the cell 
system told the people the first task viiich must be accomplished was the 
expulsion of the French. Thereafter, the Party would hand over the 
factories to the workers, rice fields to the people, and power to 
assemblies of representatives of all working classes of the nation. 
This propaganda campaign combined with the organiKational skillii of tho 
Party transformed what had been an inert and amorphous rural poptilation 
into a lively organized populace. 
In 1928 the Commmists became more aggressive. Strikes were 
organized in the northern factories as well as on southe^m plantations. 
^y 1930 strikes had increased from 10 in 1928 to 83, with 27,000 
25 
participants. Furthermore, early in 1930 leaders of the defunct 
Thanh Nien, still trying to regain centralized control over the move­
ment, found Ho Chi Minh and persuaded him to return. Ho met with the 
different regional leaders in Hong Kong,and after a series of meetings, 
the party was reunited and renamed the Indochina CoimnTanist Party (ICP) 
with headquarters in Saigon. However, it was not lintil April, 1931 that 
23 
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the ICP was finally recognized by the Comintern. At the apogee of its 
power, "in January 1931» the Comraunist Party had a strength estimated by 
27 
the Surette at 1,500 members, with about 100,000 affiliated peasants." 
Outbreak of a Rebellion 
In addition to the activities of the Communists, the conditions in 
Vietnam were adversely affected by the repercussions of the worldwide 
depression, as previously mentioned, and by the indignation the people 
felt after the French had barbarously liqviidated the VNQDD movement. 
Massive, illegal demonstrations started to reoccur. The Comintern, 
realizing demonstrations wotild only net suppressive retaliatio^i and set­
backs for the Party, warned against the use of such t&ctics. But the 
people were starving and desperate. "In some regions, starving villagers 
turned, in their need, to French administrators. They marched along the 
roads in procession, without ams, seeking help in thoir missr-y. Thsy 
28 
were dispersed by force." Other demonstrations wera not so peaesful, 
especially in Central Vietnam, the traditional birthplace of rebellions. 
Altho\agh this was the stronghold of the Communist Party, they were un­
able to restrain the teaming thousands suffering from starvation. The 
Party was swept up in the tide of madness. 
26 
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In the two central provinces of Nghe An and Ha Tinh, suiting mobs 
drove officials out after several of them had been killed. The bviildings 
of the officials, tax rolls, and other vestiges of authority were then 
destroyed. For some five months, the peasants of these two provinces 
were their ovn masters, living in a sort of organized anarchy. Commxmist 
cell leaders were able to organize demonstrations, propaganda lectures, 
and lands were redistributed among the people. But during this unstable 
time, cultivation was neglected. 
Frightened by this revolt, the largest and most successfxil of 
colonial times, the French threw "all the machinary of their police and 
29 
administration into action against the rebels." The infaeo-as Crirdnal 
Commission was reinstituted. Suspects were often brought before the 
Commission in mass and sentenced without real trials or evidence. By the 
end of 1931» the French had succeeded in smashing the revolt, and th:® 
Communist movement was temporarily shattered. Ho's^ver, mo^t of thy top 
leaders of the Directing Committee had managed to escape abroad and would 
later reemerge in the Vietnamese Revolution at an opportune time. 
Aftermath of the Rebellion 
After the colonists had finally "pacified" the Commmist inspired 
revolt of 1930-1931* a superficial and ephemeral lull settled over 
Vietnam. Members of the upper class, still seeking political power; but 
not wanting to change the economic policies of the French, again stepped 
forward attempting to achieve political representation throtigh peaceful 
means. The colonists, wanting to Vfestemize the backward people of 
29 
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Vietnam, had sent the Vietnamese yoimg Etaperor, Bao Dai, to France for 
an education. Upon returning in 1932, enlivened with effervescent demo­
cratic concepts, Bao Dai attempted to establish a reliable government. 
He appointed as his chief minister Ngo Dinh Diem, then a yotmg reknowned 
30 
intellect, already widely respected for his honesty and ability. 
Diem's efforts to initiate reforms were consistently blunted by the 
French, In frustration and disappointment he resigned. Bao Dai appointed 
another chief minister, but his regime remained as only a tool of the 
French. 
Although the Communist Party tried to reorganize on a national 
scale, their efforts were hampered ly the traditional problems of poor 
commimications. The movement was cut off from its top leadership and 
from communications with the Comintern. Its most impoi^iant figure, Ho 
Chi Mi.nh, the only leader with enough stature to unite all the factions, 
had to flee the country. 
In 1931 Ho was imprisoned by the British in Hong Kong, The French, 
who had already sentenced him to death in absentia, now requested his 
extradition from Hong Kong, In a British court battle, he xjas found to 
31 
be a "political refugee and thus not subject to extradition." Ho was 
released from jail in 1932 and apparently spent the next several years 
in Moscow attending Party schools, Vhen Japanese aggi^ssion in China 
(1937) forced the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists to join forces 
again. Ho felt that it was safe to return to the Tongking border area. 
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He did so as a member of a Chinese Communist team •which was training 
32 
guerillas. From this position, he was able to assist in the recon­
struction of the ICP by training new Vietnamese leaders and soldiers. 
However, he did not believe the time nor the situation was right for his 
reentry into Vietnam. From China, Ho was not able to regain control 
over the Vietnamese Commmist movement. In 1939 Ho Chi Minh disappeared 
once more until 19^1. 
In the South, the ICP was divided between the Stalinists, led 1^ 
Tran Van Giau who had studied in Moscow; and the Trotskyites, the more 
powerful of the two, led by Ta Thu Than who had been educated in 
33 
France. Events temporarily assisted the groi^th of the Coazmmist move­
ment, especially the Trotskyites. 
About 1936 the material and political conditions in Vietnam 
iit5)roved. The Vietnamese economy was revived as tha world rsccversd 
from its economic depression. As demands for exports increased, ths 
colons were able to employ the jobless Vietnamese. Although their level 
of subsistence remained marginal, the natives no longer driven mad ly 
starvation, became more controllable for the Communist organization. 
In the French election of 1936, the Popular Front was victorious. 
The new government proposed a more liberal approach to its colonies, 
lihile the colonial administrative apparatus was effective in stifling 
most reforms enacted by the French coalition, Brevie, the new moderate 
Governor General, was able to implement several top level changes. 
^^Ibid.. p. 98. 
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However, these changes were largely limited to Cochin China, In this 
colony, the Constitutionalist Party was revived and the Communist Party 
was permitted to operate legally. However, in the rest of Vietnam, the 
C<»nm\mist cadre illegally and slowly rebuilt their cell system. 
During the benevolent two years of the Popular Front, the 
Trotsl<yites made two serious tactical mistakes. Trying to outstrip the 
Stalinists, they decided to take full advantage of the new freedom 
granted ty the Popular Front and to do away with the impediment caused • 
hy operating secretively. Vhile this new approach added impetus to their 
political activities, it also allowed the Suretts to becorae v»ll ac-
quainted with the Trotskyites organizational structure. The second error 
of the Trotskyist Party was that they became isolated from the inter­
national Communist movement. After certain aggressive acts by the Axis 
powers, in August 1935» the Seventh Comintsm Congress declared that 
collaborating with the Vfestem democracies against thes Fascist Axis was 
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desirable. The Trotslqrist Party woiald not conform to the directive 
and became an outlaw to the international Communist movement. 
New Suppressive Acts 
In 1938 the Pop\ilar Front fell in France. Shortly thereafter, the 
Communist Party was declared illegal in both France and Vietnam. The 
colonists immediately jailed the well-known leaders of the Corammist 
Party, principally those from the Troslq'^st Party. Furthermore, those 
Troskyites that may have had a chance to flee Vietnam hesitated since 
their splinter group had become alienated from the Communist movement, 
^^Fall, The Two Vietnams. p. 98. 
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and they did not have a readily available safe haven in a foreign land. 
Elsewhere, thotigh, the French attempts to annihilate the movement were 
not very successful. Most of the Communist organization had been rebuilt 
in strict secrecy; and this time its members did not fight the repres­
sive measures of the French, but rather wisely lowered their activity 
and blended in with the population, 
Mistakingly, the colonists believed they had again broken the back 
of a resistance movement and had put the natives back in their place, 
Vftiile the French colonial apparatus, based on the method of divide and 
rule, prevailed, the Communist movement had obtained both more immediate 
and long range success than any previoixs resistance movement. There are 
some obvious reasons for this success. 
One very clear lesson the Vietnamese had learned was that the 
French would not relinqtiish political power through peacefiil m€ians. In 
fact, the main goal of the colonists was to accumulate vrealth by exploit­
ing the natives and to share power with the natives would contradict 
this main purpose. Instead of permitting various Vietnamese governments 
and officials to represent the aspirations of the people, the French con­
sistently destroyed such attempts by using them to further their own 
goals. As the puppet Vietnamese rulers and collaborating officials lost 
the respect of the people, it repeatedly became evident to other resis­
tance groups that only violent revolution could oust the French. 
The Tan Viet, v^ile advocating the forceful overthrow of the French, 
failed to give a concrete alternative form of government and also to 
establish a link with the masses. Even tho\igh the Nationalist Party, 
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the VNQDDy did present a thorough program, it vas based on democratic 
political concepts i^ch did not inclvde revolutionary organizational 
techniques. On the other hand, the Communists not only related to the 
needs of the people, but also their political concepts included a highly-
refined revolutionary doctrine. Additionally, the Communists had 
another major advantage over other insurgencies: they were able to 
obtain aid and assistance from friendly foreign states. 
The downfall of colonialism was in the interest of most Eastern 
countries, but all except Japan were too weak to be a bastion of an 
anti-coloriial movement. The Soviet l&iion was tha only iaa;soi' pow«r 'whose 
interest in destrc^ing colonialism paralleled those of ths Vietnamese 
Commmists. Therefore, from Russia and to a lesser extent from the 
Chinese Communists,Ho Chi Minh received needed support. Wien French 
retaliatory measures made not only Vietnam unsafe for th© Coimstsnisfes, 
but also other countries either controlled or InflueBosd by the Ifestem 
nations, the Communist leaders had a safe haven in the Chinese Party 
system or, if need be, in Russia. During the reconstruction of the 
Party, especially after the disaster of 1930-31» the Communists were 
able to train new recrxdts in Coimaunist schools in foreign lands and 
then replenish the ranks of their cell system in Vietnam.. 
••To the outsider, Indochina seemed unusually prosperous and quiet 
in 1939 ̂ rtien the Second Word War began, a docile outpost of empire ready 
35 
to lend its full support to the French war effort." Such was not the 
case. Events inspired by the desire for independence had united the 
35 
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people and a nationalistic spirit was emerging* The Commtnists^ ̂ o had 
already partially harnessed the powers of nationalism, were only waiting 
for an opportunity to act. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE VIET MTNH 
The Impact of Vforld 14a,r II 
The Second World Vfeir turned the tide against colonialism. After 
the defeat of the French armies and the establishment of Vichy France in 
1940, French Indochina was cut off from her mother country ajid left to 
fend for herself. Japan moved swiftly to take advantage of the situation. 
Japan Controls Indochina 
As previously mentioned, Japan had modernized her eoonomy* H©r 
rapidly expanding industrial complex required an abundance of natural 
resources which were not available in Japan. However, Asia was well 
endowed with these scarce resources, but for the most part thsse richess 
were controlled by the %stem colonial powers. Japsn wanted to sstab-
lish a new order in the East, called "The Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere,"^ which would permit her to be the dominating force. 
She decided to achieve this aim through conquest, whereby she would expel 
Vfestem influence and subjugate other Eastern nations to her authority, 
Indochina was high on her list of objectives. 
Since 1937 Japan had been at war with China and had sealed off all 
China's main resupply routes from her allies, except for material arriving 
^Edwin 0. Reischauer, Japan: Past and Present (New Yorkj Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1964), p. 195. 
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over the railway from Indochina. On June 19* 19^# the Japanese pre­
sented an ultimatiun to the French Governor General Catroux in which they 
2 
demanded the closing of this supply route. Catroux had no logical 
choice but to accept. Through this ultimatum and a series of others, 
Japan obtained permission to station her troops at strategic points in 
Vietnam. However, due to the extensive committments of her army, Japan 
did not want total French banishment. She wanted the French, under 
Japanese control, to administer internal affairs, thus reducing the need 
to station a large Japanese army in Vietnam. On October 5» 19^0, Japan 
3 
formally recognized French sovereignty over Indochina. 
Just prior to this accord, a Japanese unit had attacked a French 
garrison. Vietnamese nationalists, inspired by Japanese achievensnts 
and her propaganda of "Asia for the Asians," decided to join forces with 
the Japanese. A major armed insurrection was started, but the Japansso, 
instead of assisting the Vietnamese after an easy and quick victory, 
stepped back and idly observed as the colonists brutally crushed another 
irevolt. This had a shattering effect on the Vietnamese illusion of 
Japan's concept of "Asia for the Asians." Henceforth, both foreign 
powers became enemies of the nationalist movement. 
Vforld Events Assist the ICP 
In 1930 Ho Chi Minh believed the creation of the ICP was premature, 
but created it only to reunite the Party. Vforld events soon altered the 
intransigent position of the Comintern and other Marxists. Hitler, in 
2 
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breaking his 1939 pact with Stalin, attacked Rxissia. The Comintern re­
established its priozdties and ordered its members to work with all pro-
ally movements to defeat the Axis aggressors. The only enemies of the 
working class and the Vietnamese people were now Geiman and Japanese 
Fascists and Imperialists. In Vietnam itself, the nationalists were no 
longer expected to fight French rule and colonialism, "but only the 
lackeys of the Fascism vho ruled Indochina as a virtual colony of Japan," 
Taking advantage of the situation, the ICP met with other less 
important groups in May, 19^1s "The New Vietnam Party; the Vietnam 
Revolutionary Youth League; elements of the old Vietnam Nationalist 
Party (VNQDD); and various National Salvation . . . oi%anxz^clQrt»"'' Duel­
ing the course of this meeting, these groups banded together to create 
the League for the Independence of Vietnam, or Viet-Nam Doc Lap Dong 
Minh Hoit better known as the Viet Minh.^ The pui^ose of fch^ Viet Mjrih 
was to mobilize and organize the national spirit of th© 3iass^.v and to 
win Vietnam's independence. While the political direction of the Viet 
Minh was nationalistic and, thus, away from the Communist concept of a 
revolutionaiy class stnjggle, its hierarchy was dominated by members 
from the ICP. Ho Chi Minh was named the General Secretary of the Viet 
Minh. 
^Buttinger, Vietnamt A Dragon Embattled. Vol. 1, p. 225. 
^Bernard B. Fall, The Viet Minh Regime (New York: Institute of 
Pacific Relations, 1956), p. 1. 
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The Kuomintang Interferes 
As the Viet Minh organization started to show progress, it was 
thwarted by the Kuomintang. Vfenting a Vietnamese revolutionary conatiit-
tee more in line with their type of government, the Kuomintang called a 
meeting in October, 19^ of the different major political factions of 
Vietnam, except for the ICP. Under strong Chinese pressxure, Vietnam 
Revolutionary League, the Viet-Nam Cach Menh Dong Minh Hoi or Dong Mlnh 
y 
Hoi (DHH), was launched by the conference, dominated by the VNQH) and 
under the leadership of Nguyen Hai Than, a Vietnamese 1^0 had resided in 
7 
China since I9O8 and iidio held a General's rank of the Kuoadntar.g 
To assist the DMH, the Kuomintang had Ho Chi Hinh, along with 
several of his top lieutenants, jailed. Even thotigh Ng\:Qren Hai Than 
continued to receive aid, including financial support from the Chinese, 
he proved to be an ineffective leader. The DJffi becaaio fragmented as? the 
various group leaders refused to obey the ill-concoivod orders of Than5 
and the organization failed to become a hinderance to the Japanese in 
Vietnam, Realizing only the Viet Minh could accomplish this task, the 
Chinese released Ho from prison in early 1943, 
In March, 1944, as the Allied forces continued to press the Axis 
Powers and ultimate victory was only a question of time, another congress 
of the Viet Minh was held. This one was to detemine the platform for a 
Provisional Republican Government of Vietnam. Again, under the influence 
of the Chinese, the platform was structured similar to the Kuomintang; 
and the newly created government had a non-Commimist majority. Ho Chi 
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Minh held only a cabinet post. The program of the nei^om government 
was brief: "(a) liquidation of both the French and the Japanese grip on 
Q 
Vietnam; (b) independence for Vietnam with help of the Kuomintang." 
Favorable Conditions for the Viet Mnh 
However, the headquarters of the Provisional Government remained 
in China and exerted an inappreciable influence on events in Vietnam. 
Its members, other than the ICP, were Without arms, resources, or an 
organization in Vietnam. Therefore, the Nationalist leaders remained 5n 
southern China, waiting for the day i^en the Kuomintang would carry them 
to power. Meanwhile, the ICP, working under the auspices cf the 
Nationalist Viet Minh and with the blessing of the Provisional Republican 
Government of Vietnam, continued to expand their cell network in Vietnam. 
They established guerrilla bases and won many recruits, particularly 
among the Vietaamese soldiers of disbanded French colojiiftl forces. Ho 
Chi Minh, the only cabinet member to enter Vietnam ijn 19kM'f joined up 
with one of his top lieutenants, Vo Nguyen Giap, who was destined to 
become a reknowned militaiy genius. Ho soon controlled the vital Thai 
Nguyen area in the motintains north of Hanoi, which until the Geneva 
ceasefire of 195^» remained a major Viet Minh stronghold. As often 
stated in history, the Viet Minh and the ICP became synonymous because 
the reins of control were firm]^ in the hands of Ho Chi Minh. 
An Important Event 
Although the Viet Minh organization continued to make steady 
progress, by August, 19^5* it still lacked the power to challenge the 
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French* Vfeile the Viet Minh had a guerrilla force vhich was poorly 
armed of approximately 5*000 men, the French ccnnmand had a well-equipped 
9 
anny of 99»000 men. Just as significant, the French colonial apparatus, 
left intact by the Japanese, still held the strategic locations and con­
trolled the coxmtiy by their "divide and rule" strategy. But m event of 
singular importance changed the alliance system within Vietnam. 
As the tide turned against the Axis Powers, most of the Froichm^i 
in Indochina disclaimed Vichy France and became ardent supporters of 
Goieral de Gaulle. He headed the Free French Government that planned on 
reestablishing the Fr^ch Empire. The Japanese, awars of this trend, 
felt the colonists would eventually rise against then. Therefore, on 
March 9» 19^5» the Japanese unleashed a surprise putsch whereby they dis» 
anaed the colonists and imprisoned their leaders) 
The entire Indochina sitviation was transformed oveitiight^ 
The Japanese set out to dismantle the French adroini strati on 4nd 
security structure and to establish a more reliable rsplacssient 
for the duration of the war. Psychologically, the Japaass® 
crumbled the myth of French omnipotence and invulnerability. At 
a more practical level, the Japanese were obligated to encoui^ge 
Vietnamese participation on every level of administration and 
even to establish local militia forces.^0 
Traditionally, the Vietnamese strategists have always attached 
great importance to developing a long-tem perspective and also recog­
nizing the "Thoi Co" or the crucial moment yHion decisive action is 
required.Traditional aspirations had formal the long-term plan; the 
%cAlister, Vietnamt The Origins of Revolution« pp. 96, 102. 
^^Russell Stetler, ed., The Military Art of People's Vfar (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1970), p. 20. 
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the putsch sifforded them the latter. Ho Chi Minh*s forces quickly moved 
into the political vacuum left by the French. 
The Viet Minh extended their control over almost all of rural 
northern Tongking. "Practically without having fired a shot, the Viet 
12 
Minh could boast of having 'liberated* North Vietnam.'* From the 
American Office of Strategic Services, several American army officers 
joined the Viet Minh to assist in the evacuation of downed American 
pilots. These Americans, sympathetic with the Viet Minh in their aspl» 
rations for independence, gave them more than enough military eqxiipment 
for their limited mission. AlthoTjgh the small arms received did aot 
amovmt to more than several hxandred, they were new mA. not ofesolfets 
models. The modem communications equipment accepted from the Americans 
ing>roved the Viet Minh's command and control capabilities. However, the 
real significance of these new supplies did not lis in th^ir quantity, 
but rather in their psychological value. The new gear enhanced the 
prestige of the Viet Minh >^ch in turn aided their recruitaient efforts. 
A Chance to Prepare. As articulated by Mao Tso-Tung in his early 
writings, Ho Chi Minh knew that to win the support of the masses for a 
13 
revolution it would have to be formtilated on their aspirations. Not 
only did the Viet Minh \mderstand the people, but in the last fifteen 
years, the people came to recognize the Viet Mnh as the leader in the 
fight for independence. But in the past, the Communists had been unable 
^^Fall, The Viet Minh Regime, p. 2. 
^^John Kerry King, Southeast Asia in Perspective (New Yorkj The 
MacMillan Company, 1956), p. 80. 
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to gain control of the people or effectively organize them because of the 
continual suppressive measures of the colonists. From the first "Thoi 
Co," March 9» 19^5» until the French ultimatum to the Viet Minh, December 
19, 19^» the Viet Minh had a period of time to oz^anize which was 
appreciably free of external obstructions. Since they knew France planned 
on recolonizing their country after the war, the Viet Minh worked with 
diligence and haste to establish themselves. 
The Viet Minh*s Stirategy 
No previous resistance movement had the opportmity or the doctrine 
to develop an army like the Viet Minh did. Since the Viet llirih scknawl-
edged the superior military might of the French, thsir strategy' was 
based on Mao*s theory of the protracted war. In his long struggle 
against the Nationalist China government and Japan, Mao had learned that 
initially the insurrection forces should not tiy to fight a sonvantioml 
war, but rather a war of attrition utilizing guerrilla werfgr© tactics^ 
He specified three progressive stages an insui^ent force should follow 
in order to defeat a well-entrenched regime. The first step was the 
clandestine organization of their resources, with only limited and 
highly selective acts of armed operation. During this phase, the guer­
rilla was not only to train his own forces, but also to develop a supply 
base that would sustain his later military operations. Phase two was to 
be characterized by guerrilla warfare. Since the forces of the regime 
were still militarily superior, the insurgents had to remain elusive. 
The way of the guerrilla was to withdraw when the enei^ attacked} harass 
the enemy when he stopped to rest; and attack his flanks and rear as he 
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withdrew. This type of warfare, designed to wear down and weak«i the 
enemy, would lead to a change in the relative balance of military 
strength. As it shifts in favor of the guerrilla, he would be ready for 
phase three. The insurgents, now the dominating military force, would 
switch to conventional tactics and defeat the army of the regime in open 
battle. 
Organization of the Military 
The Viet Minh's military organization was rather evolutionaryt 
It might be said that the three parts of this (military) 
oi^anization reflected the theory of the protracted Kith, 
the popular forces representing the first psi'iod of s^rierri-llA 
action, the regional forces parallelljig the seeoad ar)d 
the regular amjy dominating the third and final phasa,^*^ 
The lowest echelon, the popular forces, was the backbone of the 
Viet Minh military organization. The responsibilities of the popular 
forces were oriented towards the village and vers mainly that of noB-
combatants. While they might participate in some sabotage md small™ 
scale guerrilla operations, their main functions were: the collection 
of intelligence information; act as guards; undertake construction 
projects; act as porters; and, most important, assist in the indoctri­
nation of their respective villages. The main theme of this campaign 
was that the entire population must rise up and participate in the 
national struggle for independence. This activity tied in with their 
last important responsibility of recruiting young peasants for the 
military seirvice of the Viet Minh. 
George K. Tanham, Communist Revolutionaiy Vbrfare (New Yorkj 
Frederick A. Praeger, 196?), p. ̂ 7* 
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Most popular force soldiers would eventually become members of the 
regional force, but such transfers depended on tvo variables: (1) the 
soldiers progress in training; and (2) ̂ at stage the revolution was in* 
If the revolution was only in stage one then there was not a sense of 
tirgency to build up the regional force. On the other hand, if the 
revolution was in the second stage, then the training time for the 
popular force was often reduced in order to replenish the regional 
units. The largest unit formed in the regional anny was a battalion. 
One of their main missions was to protect an area and its population. 
They were the troops that met and harassed French cle&riii^ operations. 
Offensively, the regional forces would conduct surprise attacks oa dut--
posts and ambush small enemy units. In short, they had the capabilities 
and were the Mature guerrilla" who kept the French off balance. 
In turn, the manpower for the regular army eaae from thei regiwoal 
forces. The transfer of a regional unit to a regular urdt dtipemed on 
the same variables t^ch applied to the transfer of popular forces to a 
regional unit explained above. In other words, if the revolution was 
moving toward phase three, the impetus to expand the regular army would 
increase. However, instead of transferring just individuals as was the 
case with the popular forces, sometimes an entire regional unit would be 
transferred to the regular arngr by merely redesignating it as a regular 
army unit. The regular army was considered the ultimate weapon for 
victory. It received the best equipment, uniforms, and training; and 
these soldiers were the highest paid. Until 1950, this force, still in 
^^Ibid.. p. 50. 
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its formative stage, teas cautiously ployed and not committed to major 
battles* As the Indochina Vbr progressed and the situation became more 
favorable for the Viet Hlnh, their regular tinits increased from yz units 
in April, 19^ to 11? tinits by June, 19511 vhile the regicmal units 
16 
decreased in the same span of time from 137 to 37 units. 
Paralleling the development and e^qiansicm of the army units, the 
Viet Minh's high command and general staff evolved from a simple guer­
rilla command staff in 19^ to a complex general staff in 19^5* l^he 
office of Minister of National Defense, under General Vo Nguyen Giap, 
was divided into three major subdivisions? The G«neral Staff was 
sible for the training and en^jloyment of the anmrj th® Genaml 
of Supplies and Maintenance handled logistics for tha army; aM th© 
Political Bureau was responsible for indoctrination. Due to the unique­
ness of the latter, it shall receive additional attention. 
The organizational structure of the Political Bureau ths 
military chain-of-coamand from the Defense Minister all the ̂ y to the 
conpany level. However, in the platoons there were political cells, 
which worked with the company political officers (commissars). The 
mission of the Bureau was '*to asstu^ proper ideological indoctrination 
of the soldiers and the integration of military actions with political 
objectives."^'' Initially, when other political factions were still 
represented, the authority of the political commissars was limited; they 
only dealt with political matters. But as the political alignment 
shifted in favor of the Communist, their authority was expanded. In 
^^bid., p. 49. ^^Ibid.. p. 35. 
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1950 a special directive stated that in case of a conflict over a nili-
taiy decision between the military commander and the political commissar, 
18 
"the latter*s view was decisive." 
Although adeqviate information is lacking» apparently the clandes­
tine party organization also operated within the military* Paralleling 
the official political organization discussed above was a secret cell 
system. Host likely, it did not attempt to dominate the situation, but 
rather assisted the commissar in maintaixdjig the Party line and in 
preventing deviation from it. 
An additional advantage the Viet Minh an^ had over previous 
insurrection fighters was in weaponry. Past rebellions had to oa 
weapons that were grossly inferior to those of the French, both in 
quality arKi in quantity. But the Viet Mlnh had several sources for their 
weapons I weapons abandoned by the colonists dtiring liorld il | wapons 
from the defeated Japanese aray; weapons acquired froa tho Haiioaniist 
Chinese; and as previously mentioned, those obtained from the Ameidcans. 
Political Organization 
The impact of Vbrld Vikr II and its aftemath also facilitated the 
Party's control over the civilian community. However, the unstable 
revolutionary conditions lAich existed in Vietnam make it difficult to 
explain the political situation because it consistently varied from place 
18 
Ibid. Also, to pass on an interesting sidelight of Tanham's, he 
states, "The Russian experience, however, may lead one to overestimate 
the role of the comwissars. In Indochina, as in China, most military 
leaders were themselves Communists, who had fought long and hard for the 
govemment, were generally loyal to its goals, and thus required rela­
tively little political supervision." p. 35* 
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to place and time to tima. Basically, however, the Party continued to 
expand and further entrench the political pyramid structure (as mentioned 
above) which had its inception back in the late 1920*s. Once the Viet 
HLnh controlled an area, they would establish an overt administration 
system. Its structure was based on the village Popular AssOTibly vriiich 
replaced the Village Council of Notables as it had become stagnant and 
powerless tinder the French. Popular Assemblies, similar in function to 
the ones in the villages, were established at provincial levels. Above 
provinces were the Regional Assemblies irtiich were under the control of 
the Central Directing Committee of the Viet Minh. Miil© Poplar A.'rseably 
menbers were "popularly" elected at each level of govarr^ewt, the 
elections were Communist controlled, irtiereby Party candidates ran 
unoppos^. 
Power did not reside directly within the Popular AssoHblies, 
but rather in the Administrative Committees who were ©lectsa by the? 
Assemblies at eveiy echelon of government. The Administrative 
Committees were to be "responsible to higher authorities" before they 
19 
were respcmsible to their own assemblies. Initially, thot:igh, the 
committees retained a great deal of autonoiqyt 
Vftiile it cannot be denied that the various local adminis­
trative bodies were originally endowed with wide powers within 
their territorial limits, those powers were progressively cur­
tailed as the Central Government consolidated its position in 
the country.^® 
^^all. The Viet Mnh Regime, p. 2?. 
^^id. 
9k 
Through this political apparatus, the Comntunists were able to 
control the econon^ and to project themselves into other fields. An 
effective channel of conmainication was opened between the Central 
Directing Committee and the village. Ibeir control over communications 
was total. Not only could they disperse their propaga]:uia extensively 
among the people, but they could also check any contradictory propaganda 
efforts. Wten the French returned after World War II, this system 
further thwarted their attempts to reinstitute their intelligence col­
lecting machines. Not only were informers scarce, but even when the 
French found one, his period of use ̂ s generally short. Re 'KayJLd ba 
detected by the Viet Kinh and liquidated. To tli© oonstematAon of the 
French, the Viet Minh often received detailed infoimation about French 
21 
military plans from the peasant population and their own spies. 
The Image of Ho Chi Minh 
The image of the Viet Minh leadership proi'ed to b«? of substantial 
in^ortance. To make national leaders known in a country with only a 
primitive communication system takes time. Over the years the people 
had come to identify with Ho Chi Minh; to them he personified the 
nationalistic movement. Ho dressed and acted like one of them. His 
only vice was smokii^. He did not gamble, drink, or have a hobby of 
collecting wives and girl friends, as did some of his later Vietnamese 
opponents. In fact, he was not even married. Ho did not use his posi­
tion of authority and power for his own personal gain. The people 
21 
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bellevad Ho Chi Minh cared about and was coiapletely coBuoitted to them* 
The Vietnamese* especially in the north* by and large loved him. 
The French Return 
Political Strategy of the Viet Minh 
The Viet Minh were awaire that the French wanted to reocci5)y 
Vietnam after Vferld War II. Giap stated, "The French are on the lookout 
22 
for an opportunity to come back to Indochina to enslave us once more." 
The Viet Jfijih decided their second "Thoi Co" would be Japan's surrender, 
which would give them a chance to counteract the French plan. At this 
point ±n time, the Vietnamese would establish a raspectabl# govemaent. 
in Vietnam and then seek international recognition. The first part of 
their strategy was successful! 
In August the revolution was unleased. On the 15th, 
General Giap and his troops marched into Hanoi, grastisd by 
massive demonstrations. Between August 19»25, the Viet Minh 
moved to power from the Red to the Mekong. On August 26, Bao 
Dai, descandent of tha ancient emperor head of thn J&panss© 
approved government in Hue, abdicated in favor of the revolu­
tionary government. ̂3 
The President of the new government, the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam (DR\f), was Ho Chi Minh who threw off whatever ties he still had 
with the Provisional Republican Government. Then, he immediately 
requested international recognition from the Wastem powers. But his 
pleas received a similar response from foreign powers as did his initial 
22 
Allen W. Cameron, Vietnam Crisis« a Docimentary Histo^t Volume 
It 19^K)-1956 (Ithacaj Cornell University Press, 1971)t P» 24. 
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efforts for Vietnamese independence after Vforld Vfer I; therefore, the 
second part of the strategy- failed. 
French Reaction 
Since effective communications never existed between the two 
peoples, the French had consideired their rule beneficial for Vietnam. 
Bebellions were always the devious deeds of an insignificantly few mal. 
adjusted and malcontented intellectuals. The peasants were without real 
values and really did not care vfeo ruled their country. Therefore, vrtiin 
the French first received word of the Viet Minh's declaration of e free 
and independent Vietnam, they considered it incredible and ridiciiliSus. 
Believing Indochina was as they had erroneously perceived it be.few© 
World Vfeir II, the French returned with their superior attitude. The 
appointed High Commissioner for Indochina, a new title for the French 
Governor General, was Admiral George Thieriy d*Argenliou who said in a 
series of statements: 
•It is the sacred duty of France to re-establish order, 
respect for the law, wherever she extends her authority.* 
French soldiers were coming to liberate the Vietnamese, who, 
according to the Admiral, were persecuted and sometimes mar­
tyrized by men of force. He reminded the Vietnamese of the 
culture and the disinterested sympathy and understanding they 
had received from France and which they would need in the 
futwe. Alongside this went his assertion . . . *Vfe will 
never give up. 
Unaware that the Viet Minh had been able to unite and organize the 
discontented people and develop an aray in excess of 100,000 men, the 
French merely thought the advocates of a firee and independent Vietnam 
Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina« p. 122. 
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represented another intelleotvially inspired rebellion which would be 
readily crushed. 
Why Two Different Approachest 
Due to the difference in circumstances» the French approach to 
North and South Vietnam was initially, opposite. South Vietnam was not 
as well prepared to oppose the French as the North was. 
The historical evolvement of the Vietnamese people started in the 
northern region of what is now Vietnam. Not lantil they freed themselves 
from the Chinese did they start their conquest of the South. Most of the 
territory that is pi^esent-day South Vietnam was only «id oscu« 
2.5 
pied by the Vietnamese since the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. ' 
The ancient traditions of the North which had withstood 1,000 years of 
Chinese rule had not been so well inbred in the South. Therefore, the 
efforts of the French to instill their customs had its most telliisg 
effect in the South. Also, the Viet Minh organisation had its oarlisist 
roots and was best organized and entrenched in the North. 
The most determining factor, though, was the difference in 
attitude and cooperation the French received from the allied nations 
which occupied Vietnam right after the Japanese surrendered. According 
to the Potsdam Conference held in July, 19^5* Indochina was to be di­
vided. The area north of l6° latitude was to be under the control of the 
26 
Chinese and the southern part under Great Britain. The main purpose of 
^•^Fall, The Two Vietnams, p. 11. 
26 
Cameron, Vietnam Crisis, a Doctimentary History« p. 
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this arrangement was to perait allied forces to control the Japanese 
troops and equipment in the region. 
The question of reinstituting colonialism had been a controversial 
subject in the international arena. For awhile it appeared that the 
United States was going to block France's return to Indochina. But since 
the United States put a higher priority on France and Britain's support 
for the United Nations» she conceded the colonial question. Vfiiile the 
C(»iference neither acknowledged nor repudiated French claims of Indochina, 
the arrangement itself opened the door for them. Britain* i^o likewise 
had designs on reestablishing her colonial interest in the East» was 
amendable to the z^occupation scheme of the French in the South. 
Ia the Korth, the sitiiation was different. China d5.d not have a 
commcm interest in colonialism like Great Britain. In fact, she had 
been one of the countries exploited by Vfestem imperialHJ.stori-. 
cally. Southeast Asia was in her sphere of influence. Su.t China 
realized, in her dreadfully weakened state, that she coxtld not sustain 
herself in North Vietnam. However, she planned on obtaining benefits 
from the French for her departure. 
The British Arrive in the South 
On September 12, 19^5* British troops under General Gracey landed 
27 
in South Vietnam. VELthin the same month, the first French troops 
arrived on British warships. To increase their strength, French soldiers 
vho had been interned by the Japanese were armed. Imediately they 
27 
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aounted a campaign to reconquer the South by oeciQ^ying aU the public 
buildings in Saigon held by the Viet Hinh*s connsittee of the South* The 
Communists» catight by surprise, started an armed coxxnterattaek against 
the French. General Grac^ quickly came to the aid of the battered 
French troops. He not only employed his own troops* but also reamed 
the Japanese and ordered them to assist the French in the battle against 
the Viet Kinh. Even after the main body of the French Amy arrived in 
Vietnam in October 19^5» the French continued to receive vital support 
from the British. General Le Clerc» Commander of the French Amy, 
confidwitly predicted that he would completely crush the Yiot MlhK in 
South Vietnam within one month and classified his task as a aisr© 
ping up operation.*'^® Although General Le Clerc's can5>aign lasted three 
months instead of one month (even then the opposition had not been 
crushed or rendered ineffective), by February 59 19^6 th-? did 
29 
hold a position of dominance in the South. 
In the Norths-Obstacles 
Meanwhile, the French had found an entirely different situation in 
the North. China, in no hurry to relinquish her hold on "Uie North, had 
not permitted one armed French soldier into North Vietnam by February, 
19^. After a series of negotiations, on February 28, 19^» China did 
agree to withdraw her forces in return for trade concessions in Indochina 
and for France's renunciation of extra-territoriality in China, 
28 
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llie Chinese evacuation was slow and was not con^leted until the 
stamner of 19^« However, after they did leave, the French populace In 
the North was still unarmed and they, as well as the region, were under 
con^lete control of the Viet Mlnh. The French tried to obtain from them 
a peaceful return of the French Army through negotiations, i4iich had 
31 
actually started in secret In September, 19^5* Even though certain 
concessions and compromises were reached in a series of conferences and 
agreements, a peaceful solution was not possible since their objectives 
were mutually exclusive. In December, 19^ hostilities erupted between 
32 
the Viet Minh and the French in the North* 
A New Type of War 
As the war progressed, it became obvious that the table had been 
reversed since pre-World >£ar II times* !nie insurgent, the Viet Hinh, 
had most of the advantages. 
The French militaiy, who had an inaccurate assessment of the Vist 
Minh's militaiy strength, planned and fought for a quick military 
decision. The Viet Minh, on the other hand, elected to wage a long, 
lasting battle. The French, unsuccessful with their strategy, were 
forced to fight a war of attrition. This type of conflict favored the 
Viet Minh: 
The Viet Minh had an advantage over the French in all 
respects except in the number of regular troops and amovmt of 
heavy equipment. The Viet Minh had few cities to garrison and 
defend, no post or blockhouses to guard and hold, and except 
for the Viet Bac, \^ch was practically impregnable, few 
3%id.. p. 72. ^Ibid. 
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territories so vital that they could not be temporarily aban­
doned if defending them proved too difficult or costly. 
Although the French had a modem army, almost twice the size of Giap's 
regular army, they had fewer troops available for offensive operations 
than the Viet MLnh.^^ 
The rugged, jungled terrain also was a valuable ally of the Viet 
Mlnh. Mien the French did mount an offensive operation, the terrain 
covered the withdrawal routes and hiding places of the guerrilla. Because 
France's mechanized army was road>bound to a sparse and primitive road 
network; in some cases, its modem war machine proved to be a liability 
instead of an asset. When an offensive operation would expand itself, 
the Viet ffi.nh knew what roads the withdrawing forces had to use, thus 
permitting than ample opportunity to harass the homeward-bovtnd French 
forces by selecting ideal ambush sites. 
In a gueridlla war, there are no front lines or roar arsas« The 
Viet Minh, having a tremendous advantage in gathering military inteJli" 
gence, kept close surveillance over the French, searching for vulnerable 
points to attack. Increasingly, imsuspecting or unprepared outposts, 
convoys, and patrols came mder attack. The Viet Minh attack would 
generally catch the defender by surprise; and before a reactionary force 
could reinforce the beleaguered position, the attacker would disappear 
into the jungle. 
^%uttinger, Viet Nami A Political History, p. 330. 
^\bid. 
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Terror tactics also were profitable for the Viet Minh because they 
were able to use them selectively. However, this was not the case with 
the French. Psychologically, the French Expeditionary Corps was not 
prepared for guerrilla warfare. Many seasoned veterans had fought in 
Vforld Vfer H, a conventional war, and expected to fight a similar typo 
war in 3iidochina, To them, the guerrilla became the unknown enemy— 
unexpectedly appearing, striking, and disappearing before the French 
could effectively react. Peasants, acting like normal rice paddy woricers 
one moment, became an attacking force the next moment. This uncertain 
environment generated fear and anxiety within the French kTrajy causing 
them to react at times in an indiscriminate manner against the people. 
The victims of these unexplainable acts of terror only became more con­
vinced of the evil nature and intent of the French. Thus, many uncom­
mitted Vietnamese were driven into the only effective anticolonial 
force, the Viet Mnh, 
Political Folly 
Not only were the French unsuccessful militarily, but also politi­
cally. Unable to obtain their goal through direct negotiations or war­
fare with the Viet Minh, the colonists decided to install a Vietnamese 
government 'vrtiich would be pro-French and would act as a counterweight to 
the Viet Minh, To achieve this aim, the colonists needed the cooperation 
of the different uncommitted ethnic and religious groups. Hopefully, 
the new government would sap the support and straigth of the Viet Minh; 
and then through this friend]^ government, the French could reestablish 
its domain. 
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The new High Conraissicaier Bollaent initiated the drive for a new 
Vietnamese government in a speech he made in Hanoi May, 19^7, in idiich 
he stated: 
Any man whose judgment is not warped by hatred will 
acknowledge that we have rights and legitimate interest in 
Indochina. Vfe have sown much seed there and we are not 
ashamed to say that we do not wish to be cheated out of the 
harvest. 
Then» he went on to say how the French and Vietnamese should work 
together to develop a better Indochina and that "through the fault of a 
few men, one Indochinese people is suffering" and how peace could be 
restored: 
Let them send us representatives of all their partis 
I say *all their parties* because France does not rescgniao 
that one party has the exclusive right to speak in ths nasie 
of the Vietnamese people.35 
Naturally, not "all their parties" nor even a few of the parties rallied 
to this plea. But Bollaent had a plan which would mita a raetxca group 
behind one Vietnamese leader. 
JE^peror Bao Dai, in exile in Hong Kong, was still a prestigious 
36 
figure among the other "parties," Through a series of agreanents 
granting Vietnam "independence," the French were able to persuade Bao 
Dai to establish the State of Vietnam. 
The new state was not well received by the Vietnamese. Although 
the different agreements grantir^ "indepaidence" received wide newspaper 
and radio dissemination throughout Vietnam, the inhabitants still recog­
nized the primacy of the colonists. These convictions were based on the 
Cameron, Vietnam Crisis* a Documentary Historr, pp. 106~07. 
^^bid.. p. 101. 
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presmce of French soldiers and officials on Vietnam soil and the overall 
dcnainating role of the Fmich. As late as 1953* the Fr^ch were able to 
devalue the ciirrency of Indochina Klthout prior consultaticai or even 
37 
notifying the State of Vietnam Government. 
Basically, the French were trying to use the new govemmait as a 
method to i^qjlement the principle of "divide and rule." But instead of 
promoting their cause, the new government detracted from their efforts. 
Some leadir^ nationalists like Ngo Dinh Diem, who was both anti-
colonialist and anti-Viet Minh, refused to bo associated with the counter- . 
Weight, The Viet Mlnh were incensed by the "puppat goverajaotit" SEii ussd 
it to fvirther exclaim the evil intent of the French, He Cisi JSjih 
declared} 
Furthermore, they (the French) tried to get past our national 
assenbly and our government. They planned to set up a puppet re­
gime in our countiy and to use Vietnamese people to light 
Vietnamese people. We certainly shall not accept thoE® htirailiatii. 
ing conditions and we shall fight to the bitter end foi* cojiipl&fce 
independence and unity,33 
Other uncommitted nationalistic groups became more alienated toward 
the French, Thses groups felt the State of Vietnam Government dashed the 
hopes of the creation of a Vietnamese alternative to the Viet Ifioih, ^ifiith 
this disillusionment, -Uiey elected to join forces with the Viet Minh, 
The Indochina fer Becomes Internationalized 
The First Indochina Wkr, ̂ rtiich started as a private war between 
France and the Viet Minh, suddenly took on an international character, 
^"^Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina, p, 300, 
^Cameron, Viotnaa Crisis, a Docmantary History« p, ll6. 
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In 1949 the Chinese Comnmnists were victorious in their civil war. Red 
China recognized the Demorcrtic Republic of Vietnam on January I6, 1950; 
39 
shortly, Moscow was to follow suit. lifi.th increased supplies from 
China, the Viet Minh were able to intensify their militaiy operations. 
These activities by the "Red Block" were perceived as an international 
Comiaunist threat by the Vfestem powers. Any synqjathy the United States 
still held for the Viet Minh was changed to fear. In February, 1950 
the United States Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, stated: 
The recognition by the Kremlin of Ho Chi Minh*s Communist 
movement in Indochina comes as a surprise. The Soviet acknowl­
edgement of this movement should remove any illusions as to the 
•Nationalist* nature of Ho Chi Minh's aims and reveals Ho in 
his true colors as the mortal enemy of native independence in 
Indochina.^ 
To counteract the move of the Communists, both Britain and the United 
States recognized the State of Vietnam headed by Bao Dai; the United 
States started a massive aid program to assist the Fx'eneh effort in 
Vietnam. 
A statistical comparison of the aid received by the French from 
the United States to that which the Viet Minh received from China is not 
possible since the Communist's figures are not available. However, 
Bernard Fall, a reknowned authority on Vietnam, estimates the economic 
aid the North received to be approximately equal ••to what its southern 
41 
rival received from the United States." Joseph Buttinger, another 
39Buttinger, Vietnam; A Dragon Embattled. Vol. II, p. 722, 
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authority, states» "^or was the failure of the French due to massive 
h? 
outside (Chinese) aid to the Viet Minh," 
Vfi.th the internationalization of the war. Ho Chi Minh was further 
drawn into the "Red Block": 
French policy . . . left Ho with hardly any other choice. 
Since he gained nothing by pleasing the Vfest and the pro-West 
forces around Bao Dai, he put his regime, hesitatingly but 
unmistakably, into the camp of the Soviet Union and Communist 
China.^3 
Early in 1951» the Vietnamese Communist Party was resurrected mder the 
title of the Lao Dong Party (Workers Party) and a gradual pui^e of all 
Viet Minh leaders and officials not sufficiently subservient to the 
Communists followed. Although this maneuver resulted in the defection 
of some groups, especially the Catholics, from the ranks of the Viet 
Minh, the aid they received from the Communist nations mojre than compen­
sated for the losses. However, the Communists retained the support of 
most of the other ideology groups because the war stil.1 reaarfled pri­
marily a struggle for independence and the Viet >Iinh was the only 
organization with the power to accomplish this goal. 
Things Go From Bad to Worse 
An Ineffective Army 
One of the great disadvantages of the French, often lamented by 
their different commanders-in-chiefs, was that with an organized and 
better-eqtiipped fighting force, almost twice the size of Giap*s regular 
army, fewer troops were available to them for offensive action than to 
the Viet Minh. It iras estimated in 1953 that out of the total of 
^^bid.« p. 774. 
190,000 men in the Expeditionary Corps, at least 100,000 were tied down 
jfjj. 
in static defense duties. The French politicians and generals commit-
ted to victory in Indochina knew Paris would not supply more soldiers. 
Therefore, to solve this shortage, the French finally convinced Bao Dai 
in 1950 that he should develop a national amy of Vietnam, Its primary 
mission would be defense of static positions; thus, leaving the French 
Army free to maneuver against the Viet Minh. Even though by 1953 the 
Vietnamese national an^jr numbered about 500,000, the French still had 
approximately the same nximber of its troops committed to defense. Of 
course, the ever increasing strength and aggrsssivsness of thfir Viet Minh 
had forced the French to defend its installations with more soldisrs. 
But more significantly, Bao Dai's Vietnamese array proved to be ineffec­
tive. It lacked leadership, morale, and a sense of purpose. Its 
members realized that they were being used to reinstituta Fraaeh 
colonialism aiid therefore they ware \inresponsiva, irresponsible, and 
foTight poorly. 
One of the major problems for Ho Chi Minh had been to detewine 
what stage his revolution should be in. Several times, such as in 1951* 
he and Giap thought the relative battle strength favored the Viet Minh, 
Moving into the final stage of their revolution, the Viet Minh challenged 
the French in open battle—only to be soundly defeated. After such 
defeats, the Viet Minh would temporarily retreat to the second phase or 
to guerrilla tactics. But in October, 1952, Giap's regular army went 
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back on the offensive by invading Laos iihich eventually culminated in 
the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu. 
Public Opinion Awakes in France 
Initially, public opinion in France gave the Indochina Vl^r insigni­
ficant attention. There was no reason for the people to change from the 
traditional colonial appiroach* In the past, as far as the people were 
concexnedt colonial policies were formulated by the government. The 
French Expeditionaiy Corps in Indochina did not contain conscripts, <mly 
regulars; and the majority of them were drawn from other parts of the 
45 
Empire and not from metropolitan France. Also, ths pocple wart; mairily 
concerned with domestic issues and were not inforaed or a.'mre of the 
realities of the conflict. 
This lethargical attitude suddenly changed after 1952 when 
metropolitan France realized what the war was costing tueaii Many 
Frenchmen blamed the Indochina for France's slo*'^ economic 
after World Hair II. By 1952 the war was costing "Uie French 270 billion 
k6 
francs a year or 33*5 per cent of her military budget. The French 
Parliament realized that the continuation of the Indochina Vfeir was not 
within the political or economic interests of France* 
In the eyes of more and more Frenchmen, the war was a 
•bottomless abyss, an adventure without a solution, and a 
sacrifice that had become absuid.• Even people whose patri-
otiaa was beyond question began to refer to the Indoci^a 
War as *the dirty war* ... 
46 
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The Geneva Agreement 
After Ho Chi Minh had declared himself ready to talk peace in 
November of 1953» the •'Big Four" agreed to hold a conference at Geneva 
in order to seek a solution for the Indochina War and ostensively the 
hQ 
Korean Vfeir. After three months of negotiations* on July 21, 195^* the 
Geneva Agreement was signed. It officially ended the fighting in 
49 
Vietnam and established a modus vivendi. According to the Agreem^t, 
a provisional military demarcation line was established roughly along 
the 17th parallel, thus dividing Vietnam into two separate zcmes. The 
northern zone was to be controlled by the D.R.V.H. and the seiithexts sons 
by an interim government of South Vietnam. A final pol4tic©S®>@Bttleiaml 
was to be decided through a general election by secret ballot in July, 
1956. The Vietnamese would choose between the government of South 
Vietnam and the D.R.V.N. Ho Chi Minh felt confident that 
would easily win the election and thus fulfill his goal cf a ̂ ifiody 
indepexwient Vietnam. "In 1954* it seemed clear to most observers as 
well as to Hanoi that such elections would be won by Ho Chi Minh's 
regime. 
Of coxirse, time has disproven the prediction of a D.R.V,N, victory 
by 1956. Extensive involvement by the United States and to a lesser 
extent Russia ard China in the Indochina War has further complicated the 
Vietnam situation. 3y 1956 the government of South Vietnam, supported 
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by the United States» decided against the election. Althovigh the 
has continued, the defeat of the French and the end of colonialism is a 
logical place from i^ch an assessment of the evolvement of Vietnam's 
nationalism can be made. 
CHAPTER ra 
SOMMART AND CONCLUSION 
Characteristics of Prg-colonial Vietnamese Society 
Prior to the arrival of the French, Vietnamese society possessed 
many of the common characteristics of nationalism. In fact, their 
society was more homogeneous than ware most Vfestem states. The 
Vietnamese were from the same ethnic background, all spoke the same 
language, and most of their common traditions and customs wera older-
than Christianity. Furthermore, the people had their national heroes, 
a common enesny in China, and lived in a well-defined geographical area. 
Hot«3ver, primarily due to the village system, the Vietnamese lacked a 
national spirit. Their main political allsgianco t-ias to the village. 
Over 90 per cent of the people lived in rather isolattjd &nd 
autonomous villages. The villagers were basically self-sufficient and 
interaction between them and other members of the society was minimal. 
Officials of the central government dealt with the village as a unit 
through the village's Council of Notables and did not directly control 
or deal with the people. Miat demands the central government would 
place on a village were limited according to ancient customs. Once cer­
tain levies ware established for a village, the Council of Notables 
would then determine how the villages wo\ild fulfill the demands of the 
monarchy. 
Ill 
112 
In reciprocity for this support, the villagers expected the 
monarchy to protect them from invasion and cornipt governmental officials 
who would exploit the people. In addition, the central government was 
responsible for national projects which would be beneficial or necesisary 
for the countiy; for example, canals, dikes, and a military force. If 
and ii^en the monarchy failed to meet its responsibilities to the people, 
and if such failures created intolerable conditions for the masses, then 
the people would revolt. 
Since governmental improbity was relatively coinmon in Vietnam's 
histoiy, it provoked numerous revolts which in turn had an adverse 
effect upon the unity of the central government. Eebellions against ths 
central government were generally in response to the needs of a local 
region and were not national in nature. Vftien a rebellion was successful, 
its leaders wanted to maintain their newly won poT®r and not surr-ender 
it to the centrc^l government. 
In fact, the capable monarch was best able to unify his countiy 
when it faced a common enemy, such as the Chinese or the Mongols. How­
ever, these united efforts were not pemanent for several reasons. The 
people and regional loaders did not fight to protect and preserve the 
central govemmant, but rather to protect their specific interests. 
Once the eneagr was defeated, the people returned to their village and to 
its traditional ways, and new regional leaders wotild reemerge to oppose 
the authority of the central government. However, French colonialism 
was to significantly alter the character of Vietnamese society. 
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Conditions Vhich Unified the Vietnamese 
In the seventeenth century, the machinery of the monarchy was in a 
state of decline and decay, and it had not been meeting its z^sponsibili. 
ties to the people. Vfi.th the people on the verge of massive revolts and 
continioally threatened by the forces of regionalism, the monarchy was in 
no position to defend against a powerful Western state like France. The 
French Government conquered Vietnam with little knowledge of that country 
and even less concern for its people. Napoleon III wanted Vietnam, 
mainly, for a naval base from which he hoped to cotmteract the growing 
might and prestige of the British in the Far East. The early French 
rulers wanted to control Vietnam with minimal French forces. They had 
planned to rule through the monarchy, leaving the laandarinate elite 
intact. But, when the mandarins refused to support the invaders and 
abandoned their positions, the French then had to personally operate the 
bureaucracy. 
The new bureaucracy ms not composed of trained, loyal French 
public servants, but rather by men who had almost no administrative 
background. As various private French entrepreneurs moved into Vietnam 
to take advantage of the exploitable situation, they were soon able to 
purchase the loyalties of the bureaucrats and hence gain control of the 
colonial government. This resulted in a self-serving bureaucracy which 
usurped the authority of the office of the Governor General—this lost 
authority was never recovered by the French Government. 
The impact of Flinch colonialism shattered the foundation of 
Vietnamese society and ci^ated a social transformation within Vietnam. 
One of the more significant results of this transformation was the 
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emergence of a class structure. However, within the class structure 
there were no institutions which delineated responsibilities, rights, 
and protection for the different classes; there was nothing to replace 
the controlling aspects of ancient customs which had been rendered obso­
lete and ineffective. Only the upper and middle classes were relatively 
free of want. The lower class or the peasants, who comprised more than 
90 per cent of the population, continually suffered from malnutrition. 
None of the classes had political representation and all had to ezKiure 
the arrogant and insolent attitudes of the French. 
To govern themselves, the colonists utili?.sd the mlaiAvmlj 
equitable judicial system developed in metropolit&Ji Franca. But the 
Vietaamesa did not have access to this judicial system. Basically, they 
were at the mercy of the colons. Vietnamese who collaborated with the 
colons in their efforts to exploit Vietnam were granted special pzdvi-
leges. Since a colon could also withdraw privileges at his o^vVi discre­
tion, the position of a colon's favorite was a precarious one. 
Of courso, the class that stiffered the most was the lower class. 
They had to contend with tiie colonial system which demanded more of what 
they, the people, produced, ̂ rtiile not significantly improving production 
methods. The economy of the peasants varied with the prosperity of the 
colonists. When exports were in demand and prices high, the people's 
sTibsistency was marginal. But, vhen prices and demands fell, the people 
knew starvation. Since any improvement in the plight of the peasantiy 
was not within the economic interest of the colons, the lower class was 
left without protection. They were exploited by both the French and the 
upper classes of Vietnamese, especially by the large landowner. 
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Vietnam's initial reaction to the French conquest was mixed. There 
was a tinge of xenophobia, the mandarin^ were fearful of the new concepts 
of the foreigners, but most of the people were apathetic. They had been 
disgruntled and displeased with the corrupt central government and did 
not think the French could be any worse. This preception soon changed. 
Indeed, as the colonists instituted their debased methods of governing, 
the apprehension of the Vietnamese became deeper and more encompassing 
than had been their initial response. Their anxiety was based t^on the 
nature and methods of the colonial system which was degrading to the 
dignity of all Vietnamese and actually threatening th© of 
most of the Vietnamese. If the Vietnamese were to persist as a people, 
thai they had to free Vietnam from the tyranny of the colonial 
bureaucracy. 
The Struggle and Its Evolutionai'y Effects 
To rid Vietnam of the French, the Vietaiaa^se had fuar basic courses 
of action* (1) they could attempt to obtain a position of political pre­
dominance by working with the colonists; (2) they could try to forcefully 
dispel the foreigners; (3) they coxild try to gain the support of a major 
power which could force the French out of Vietnam; or, (4) they could use 
any successful combination of the other three courses of action. 
From 1900 until the 19^0*s, different groups or organizations 
attempted to achieve an independent Vietnam by following one of the 
courses of action. Although each one was suppressed by the French, these 
defeats, coupled with the persisting adverse social conditions and the 
influence from external events, did not check the people's desire for 
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their independence, but rather intensified the struggle. This intensi­
fication actually had an evolutionary effect upon both the Vietnamese 
methods of revolution and goals for governments each will be reviewed 
separately. 
By the 1930*s Ho Chi Minh, as well as other contemporary revolu­
tionaries, realized that to defeat the French, only one option would be 
effective. Movements lead by Phan Chau Trinh and the Constitutionalists 
had proved to them that political representation cotild not be attained 
through French cooperation. Phan Boi Chau's experiaices taught the 
Vietnamese leaders of the 1930's that they could not expect a tl-ilixi 
major power to defeat the French for them. Therefore, th© Vifetiiftifneee 
wotild have to irely mainly on their own resoui?ces to defeat tha French. 
From the leaders of the Russian Revolution, Ho Chi Mlnh was able 
to expand his knowledge on revolutionary methodology* Lcclcijsg back ml 
evaluating his own endeavors, an old Phan Boi Chau told tho joarsg Ho Chi 
Minh that "those who wish to liberate the country will have to form a 
strong party. Not only did Ho find in the Communist movement the 
advanced organizational and revolutionary methods necessary to build a 
strong party, but also a valuable ally. Since the destruction of 
colonialism was, likewise, within the interest of the Comintern, it gave 
limited but critical support to Ho Chi Minh. 
Most of the leaders in the 1930*s became cognisant of the current 
and future political realities for Vietnam. Too many changes had taken 
place within her own state and in the entire Far East for her ever to 
^Lacouttire, Ho Chi Minhi A Political Biography, p. l6. 
117 
return to her monarchical-type government of yesteryear. Under the 
impact of the French, a social transformation had engvilfed Vietnam, Her 
econony was partially modernized by the creation of large rubber planta­
tions, mines, construction projects, small industry, and a large export 
business. The econocQr had become more centralized and a class structtire 
had developed. The autonomous village system would never fit into such 
a system and, therefore, was gone forever. This conditiwi was fxirther 
intensified by a similar process \riiich had engrossed most of Vietnam's 
powerful neighbors. China, Vietnam's giant and historical eneny to the 
north, was also in a state of social transformation. She Had besn 
exploited by the West and was now trying to modemiz® h®r ^gaeiety ia 
order to regain her sovereignty, Japan had already modernized her 
state; she had defeated Russia in a war and was recognized as a major 
power. In addition. Western influence was a penranent faetbl' for the 
Eastern states to contend with. In such an internati onal, a stable 
but static Confucian-t3rpe state could not compete and, therefore, exist 
with the dynamic, ever advancing. Western type state whose concepts were 
based on science and technology. French rule would have to be replaced 
by some type of a central government vriiich would unit the forces of 
Vietnamese society from the top of government to the village level. 
As explained in the body of this paper, the ICP had been contained 
by the colonists, but they had not been able to liquidate it as they had 
other rebellions. However, World War II gave Ho Chi Minh and his lieu­
tenants the opportunity and the time to organize the latent and the 
coinmon national aspirations of the people into an effective national 
force. This new party was called the Viet Minh, Its political 
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organization, which was authoritarian in nature, ruled all levels of 
govemraent. "When the French returned after Vforld War II, the Viet I6.nh 
were strong enough to fight a war of attrition. 
The Decisive VairLable 
The French reconquest efforts had the most success in the South 
for two reasons; immediately after World War II, the French had the 
massive and powerful help of the British military; and secondly, the 
Viet Minh organization was not as well prepared in the South as in the 
North. It must be noted, however, that the French never regained com­
plete control over any region of Vietnam. Even more sigrdficaiit, men 
the French attempted to build a Vietnamese government and •wM.oh 
were to act as a counterweight to the Viet Minh, they were never 
effective. The people did not accept the puppet government and its arn^ 
lacked a fighting spirit. Such a diabolical scheme to get the Vietnaraese 
to fight Vietnamese for the French ends only further increased ths 
people's resentment toward the French. Realizing that the Viet Minh was 
the major anticolonial power, the people became more adaraent in their 
support of Ho. Chi Minh. 
After the French failed to gain a quick victory over the Viet Minh, 
the war became one of attrition. Then, vrtiat proved to be the decisive 
variable was the commitment of the two peoples: the Vietnamese and the 
French. The Vietnamese perceived the war as one in which their national 
survival was at stake. They were willing to make infinite sacrifices to 
gain ultimate victory. The French people, on the other hand, were 
scarcely aware that the war was going on xmtil 1953. At that point in 
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time, it became clear to metropolitan France that the Indochina War was 
adversely affecting their economy. If the war was to continue, the 
French people would have to sacrifice further materials needed by their 
own economy which was trying to recover from World Vfeir II. Most French 
people did not perceive any benefit for them from a Fr«ich victory on a 
remote peninsula in Southeast Asia. If the v;ar was going to cost them 
anything, then they wanted none of it. 
Under movmting public opinion to get out of the "dirty little war," 
in 195^ the French Government took advantage of Ho Chi Minh's amendable 
attitude for a negotiated settlement as mentioned aarlier in thj.s paper. 
As the shootir^ war came to an end and France started to withdx-aw her 
forces, victoiy belonged to the nationalistic aspirations and courage of 
the Vietnamese people. Victory had been obtained by a nationalistic 
efforti a common people; fighting a common enemy; for & eomon causej 
and for a common destiny. 
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